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PREFACE

Freedom of expression is an essential core of a wellfunctioning,
iree and open society.

But, for practical reasons, the freedom of

speech and press cannot be given an absolute value in a society
of multiple freedoms.

Other values and societal interests inevitably conflict

with the freedom of expression.

A malicious lie,

for instance, not

misinforms the public? it may also seriously destroy an individual's
reputation.

Or, publishing statements about a person's private life

may constitute an interference with his right to privacy, the right to
be left alone.

Surely, too, there is a prime interest in the public's

awareness of governmental activity; but, publishing an unauthorized
disclosure of military secrets and governmental documents during wartime
might easily jeopardize national security.

Thus, in a society which

values conflicting and competing interests, countless situations neces-

sarily arise in which the particular circumstances demand a curb on the
freedom of expression.

Providing the freedom of speech and press with

an unbounded license to trample over other social values will not only

stifle the purpose of free expression, but will also endanger the health
of a free society.
Some societal interests have been given too much protection, at the

expense of free speech.

In many states, for example, prior to

libel laws threatened the free flow of communication.

1
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The possibility

of juries awarding plaintiffs enormous financial awards for damages,

with only the defense of truth "in all its particulars" afforded to the
press, curtailed the freedom of speech by driving would-be critics into

accepting a form of self-censorship.

IV

In 1964, for the first time, the United States
Supreme Court brought

state libel laws within the reach of the first amendment.

with New Yo rk Times Co. v. Sullivan

,

Beginning

the Court has been engaged in a

process of rectifying the imbalance of interests established
in many
states prior to 1964.

The Court has devised a constitutional rule

which has continuously been rephrased and reformulated.

And, since its

initial involvement, the Supreme Court has, in effect, rewritten state
libel law.

At this point in the evolutionary process, however, it seems

that the Court will eventually imbalance libel law once again, this time

unfairly in favor of the value of free expression.

My thesis involves an analytical treatment of the New York Times case
the constitutional rule announced in that case and the Court's elaborat

tion of that rule in subsequent cases.
on the New York Times case.

Chapter

I

focuses specifically

Since that was the first instance of the

Court's involvement, and because the rule announced in that case functions as the foundation for the remainder of my thesis,

an entire chapter to a discussion of that chapter.

I

have devoted

Chapter II traces

the Court's implementation of the Times doctrine in subsequent cases.

Since New York Times created more questions than it answered, Chapter II

centers the Court's attempt to answer these questions.
Finally, Chapter III presents an assessment of the Court's handling
of the delicate problems involved in trying to balance the first amend-

ment guarantee of free expression against the social interest in protect
ing reputations.

Beginning with New York Times , freedom of the press

has been evolving toward a "preferred position," almost to the exclusion
of any protection for society's interest in safeguarding the repuations

V

oi

iuS members.

The ultimate conclusion of this evolutionary process

will result in the almost total aboltion of the ability to protect in-

dividual reputations against defamatory publications.

It appears that

the Court may eventually rule that the first amendment protection extends
to all defamatory statements except those involving the most private life

of the most private person.

The exception, however, in my view, may

prove to be merely theoretical.
The study of the Court's work in reconciling the first amendment with
state libel laws has been almost totally ignored by the political science

profession.

Therefore, for the most part, all my sources have been

written by lawyers and law professors.
I

wish to thank Professor Dean Alfange, who not only offered a great

amount of his time and extensive and very helpful comments, but who also

introduced me to the study of the Supreme Court.

My views about the

Court's work have matured primarily because of his continuous guidance.
For presenting alternative approaches to the study of the Court, and for

carefully and patiently helping me through the task of understanding
them, I wish to thank Professor Sheldon Goldman.

And, I would like to

thank Professor Loren Beth, in whose seminars and informal discussions
I

obtained many invaluable insights about the legal process.
Finally, I want to thank my wife, Patricia, for her enduring patience

while I prepared and wrote the thesis, and for her generous help in typing and proofreading the final product.
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CHAPTER

I

THE NEW YORK TIMES CASE

The Facts and the Problem

On March 29, ^960, the New York Times printed a
full-page adver-

tisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices." 1

The gist of the ad-

vertisement was a charge that blacks in the South had been
denied
their constitutional rights in their struggle to end racial
discrim-

ination.

Parts of the advertisement depicted alleged instances of

oppression against black students and their leaders.

The two para-

graphs of the advertisement which were to become the basis of libel

litigation described the following:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My country,
'Tis of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders
were expelled from school, and truckloads of police
armed with shotguns and teargas ringed the Alabama State
College campus. When the entire student body protested
to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their
dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them
into submission [third paragraph].

Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr.
King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence.
They have bombed his home almost killing his wife and
child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times for "speeding," "loitering," and
"perjury" a felony under which they could imprison him
for ten years ... [sixth paragraph].^

—

—

L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner of the city of Montgomery with

power of supervision over the police department, although not named in
the advertisement, demanded that the Times issue a public written re-

traction.

It is not unlikely that he was aware that under Alabama law,

a public official cannot recover punitive damages in a libel action con-

2

cerning his official behavior unless he first demands
a public retraction from the defendant who then refuses to comply.

The New York Times

refused to retract its statements, responding to
Sullivan's demand by

stating that "we

...

are somewhat puzzled as to how you think the

statements in any way reflect on you," and that "you might,
if you desire, let us know in what respect you claim that the statements
in the

advertisement reflect on you."^
Without answering the Times

's

question, Commissioner Sullivan promptly

brough.t a libel suit for damages against the New York Times Company and

four Negro clergymen who had signed the advertisement.

At the trial,

he claimed that the allegations of violence described in the advertise-

ment had falsely defamed him.

The connection, according to Sullivan's

assertion, lay in the fact that the words "police," in the third, and
"they," in the sixth, paragraphs of the Times advertisement referred to
him, since he was Commissioner of Public Affairs, with responsibility

for supervising the police and other city departments in Montgomery.

This tenuous, if not imaginary, link between Sullivan and the advertisement impressed the trial jury, and later the Supreme Court of Alabama,
as conclusive evidence that the alleged defamatory statements were made
"of and concerning" Sullivan.

Commissioner Sullivan did not attempt to prove special or actual pecuniary damages directly resulting from the publication of the alleged
libel.

To do this, he would have had to demonstrate that he suffered

actual financial loss from the publication of the advertisement, and
this would have required some doing.

Of the 650,000 copies of the New

York Times circulated that day, only 39^ were distributed in Alabama

3

and only 35 in all of Montgomery County.

Moreover, as Harry Kalven has

noted, even assuming the statements in the
advertisement did in fact

refer to Sullivan, "given the mood of the day, [they]
would not be

considered defamatory by a southern audience."^
Nevertheless, the trial judge ruled that the statements were
libelous

£er £e, and thus general damages were presumed.

Under Alabama law,

since the alleged libel involved statements of fact rather than opinion
or comment, the defense of fair comment was not applicable.^

The only

defense then available to the New York Times was the task of proving
that the statements were true "in all their particulars."^

This, how-

ever, was impossible, for the defense conceded that certain statements
in the advertisement were not entirely accurate.

Of the discrepancies that existed, most were of such small consequence
that the United States Supreme Court's reiteration of them was perhaps
o

intended more as a satire than as a summary of the facts.

For example,

the student protestors sang the National Anthem rather than "My Country,
'Tis of Thee."

Moreover, not the entire student body, but most of it,

had protested the expulsion of certain other students, and their protest
was not demonstrated by refusal to register, but by boycotting classes.

The police, furthermore, did not ring the campus, but, instead, "were
Q

deployed near the campus in large numbers."

Even more trivial was the

fact that Martin Luther King had been arrested four, not seven, times.

Of greater significance was the fact that the Montgomery police did not

padlock the dining hall, as the Times advertisement indicated.

These

variations from the truth, however, supplied Sullivan with ample opportunity to bury the defense of truth "in all its particulars."

Interp-

4

reting the statements of the advertisement as
falsely defaming Commissioner Sullivan, the jury awarded him the enormous
sum of 1i500,000.
The New York Times Company and four individual
defendants, who had

signed their names to the advertisement, appealed
to the Alabama Supreme Court.

However, the court sustained the trial court's rulings
in

every respect.

It further ruled that malice on the part of the
Times

could have been inferred from the newspaper's "irresponsibility,"
which, the state court ruled, was reflected, among other things,
by
the fact that the Times had in its files, at the time of publication,

articles which would have demonstrated the falsity of the printed
statements.

The Alabama Supreme Court quickly dismissed any issue of

freedom of the press by stating that "[t]he First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications." 0
Thus, for printing an advertisement characterizing the racial antag-

onism prevailing in Alabama and other parts of the South, acting perhaps
negligently, but in good faith, the Hew York Times was assessed

million dollars in civil libel damages.

a-

half

Moreover, by the time the case

was before the United States Supreme Court, eleven other libel suits by

local and state officials were pending against the Times seeking almost
$6, 000, 000 in damages.

The success of Sullivan's suit and the ease with

which he won his case inspired several other officials to take advantage
of a wealthy and "hostile" newspaper, which was made vulnerable under

Alabama law.

If judgments such as these could not be overturned, the

New York Times and other newspapers that might be looked upon with disfavor in certain states, could be ruined by the hostile application of

state libel laws.

As Professor Paul Freund has aptly noted, the problem

5

before the Supreme Court was not whether to reverse, but how to reverse
the judgment against the New York Times .

1

The New York Times advertisement was plainly a criticism of Alabama's

government in general; it was a public criticism of Alabama's response
to the civil rights movement in the South.

Only a strained reading of

the advertisement could have led to an association of the contested

statements with any particular individual.

No particular individuals

were attacked in the Times publication, and, therefore, the imposition
of punishment for this kind of criticism was, in effect, an invocation
of the doctrine of seditious libel, and thus clearly contrary to the
first amendment guarantees of free speech and press.

However, while, as Professor Kalven suggests, "Alabama somehow

pounced on this opportunity to punish the Times for its role in

sup-

porting the civil rights movement in the South," it should also be
noted, as he did, "that the Alabama decision was not simply a sham,"
for "[i]t has long been noted that the law of defamation, with its

three 'galloping presumptions' of damage, falsity, and malice, can produce sharply artificial results."

12

In the Times case, the most disturbing inequity was that, under Ala-

bama law truth "in all its particulars" was the only defense available
in cases involving statements of fact, and it was entirely possible to

forfeit this defense upon proof of even slight factual error.

The de-

fendant could, in mitigation, seek to persuade the jury that the statements, although erroneous, were made in good faith.

But it was entirely

within the discretion of the jury whether to make this accommodation.

6

The compelling nature of the case derives from the
interests at
stake.

Had the Court allowed the Alabama decision to stand,
freedom

of the press would have been seriously abridged and, in
certain parts
of the nation, virtually destroyed.

hardly have survived.

The New York Times itself could

Thus, to have sustained the Alabama Supreme

Court's decision would have been to allow the continued use of flexible
state libel law as a weapon with which to prevent legitimate criticism
of state governments by an unfriendly press.

By allowing a public of-

ficial to treat an impersonal criticism of government as a personal

defamation, the Alabama courts were making seditious libel punishable

through the use of civil libel proceedings.

Furthermore, legitimate press criticism of specific public officials

would be made virtually impossible, for, if the official could point to
even the slightest, most insignificant error, he could win his case

against the press.
State libel laws have always reflected the conflict of interests between free speech and the protection of reputations.

To protect the

interest in free expression, state laws have incorporated provisions for

"privileged," although defamatory, speech.

13

Prior to New York Times ,

states had principally adopted two degrees of "privilege."

That which

had been adopted by the larger number of states was called the "majority" position, and the other the "minority" position.

14

At the time of the decision in New York Times , Alabama followed the

"majority" approach.

Under this position, if the alleged defamation

of a public official was based on misstatement of fact, the only defense

open to the defendant was to prove truth "in all its particulars."

The

7

slightest deviation from truth could result in
liability.

apparent fate of the New York Times .

This was the

However, the "majority" position

allowed a defense of "fair comment" for statements of
opinion rather
than fact.

In order properly to invoke this defense, certain
condi-

tions had to be met.

First, the libelous matter had to relate to a

subject of public concern.

Second, the challenged statements had to be

statements of comment or opinion; any erroneous defamatory
statements
of fact were not protected.
based had to be accurate.

reasonably inferable
concern.

Third, the facts on which the comment was

Fourth, to be "fair," the comment had to be

from the facts relating to the matter of public

Finally, the "majority" privilege was not absolute; it de-

pended on the absence of malice, which was more or less vaguely defined as "ill will," "negligence," or "evil motive."

For example, if

it were claimed that a certain public official was poorly discharging

his official duties, the majority defense of fair comment might be invoked, provided that the comment was reasonably inferable

and was not made maliciously.

from facts

However, under the majority fair comment

position, if the critic had charged that the official was an alcoholic
or guilty of graft, he would have no defense but to prove the truth of

his assertion.

On the other hand, the "minority" position did not differentiate between fact and opinion in the establishment of the defense of privilege.

Under this rule, the critic of official conduct would not be assessed
damages if he could demonstrate that he did not make his charge with
malice, regardless of whether he made an erroneous statement of fact.

Thus the critic who charged that a certain official was an alcoholic or

8

guilty of graft would not be held liable if
his factual errors were
made without malice, defined as "ill will,"
"negligence," or "evil

motive."

Although the "majority" privilege of fair
comment extended to all
cases involving issues of public interest, the
"minority" rule (except in a few states) extended the privilege
for factual errors only
to criticism of public officials and candidates.

The privilege for

statements of opinion or comment under the "minority"
rule, however,
extended to all matters of public interest.
In a few states of the "minority" the privilege for
factual error

was extended to matters of general public concern
other than those

critical of public officials or candidates.

In one particularly sig—

n ifi ca nt state decision, Coleman v. MacLennan in 1908, the Kansas
Su-

preme Court ruled that the privilege protected statements involving

matters of public concern, such as
the conduct of all corporate enterprises affected
with a public interest? transportation, banking,
insurance, and innumerable other subjects involving the public welfare. ^5

State libel law, then, as it existed at the time of New York Times ,

posed serious first amendment questions.

First, under the law in a

majority of states, honest misstatements of fact were not protected,
even if the critic made the statements in good faith.

The hollow de-

fense of truth "in all its particulars" was the only available defense
for the critic.

Furthermore, even under the more liberal "minority"

rule, only a few states extended the protection for factual error be-

yond criticism of public officials and candidates.

9

Second, even where state law granted a
privilege, that privilege

was withdrawn in the event of a finding of
malice— which was vari-

ously defined rather vaguely as "ill will,” "bad
motive,” "negligence,” or by other terms loosely connoting carelessness
or malicious
intent.

But standards of liability such as "ill will” and
"bad motive”

are too uncertain adequately to safeguard the right
to criticize gov-

ernment officials.

In the day-to-day discussion of public affairs,

many critics of governmental activity will be motivated by the
hope of
seeing a particular public official removed from office.

However, that

"hope” can easily be interpreted by a jury as "ill will,” and under

such circumstances, the privilege may be forfeited.
It is, of course, true that the Supreme Court could have reversed
the

state judgment in the New York Times case without reaching the funda-

mental constitutional issue. 16

But a reversal on such grounds would

have left unanswered the underlying issue regarding freedom of speech.
The importance of the issue called for a new constitutional rule that

could uniformly and more equitably balance the conflicting interests
the protection of reputation and the protection of free expression.

The Court's Opinion and the Constitutional Doctrine

Prior to New York Times , the Court successfully avoided dealing
with the constitutionality of libel laws simply by denying that libelous speech fell within the scope of first amendment protections.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (19^+2), for example, the Court recog-

nized that there were

10

certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes
speech, the prevention and
punishment of which
have never been thought to raise
any constitutional
problem. These include the lewd
and the obscene,
tne profane, the libelous
.
.
[S]uch utterances
.
are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social
value as a step to
rutn that any benefit that may be
derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest
in order and morality. 1 ?
01

Later, in Bea uharnais v. Illinois
(1952), the Court repeated that
u lj ibelous utterances
not being within the area of
constitutionally protected speech, it is
unnecessary,
either lor us or for State courts, to
consider the
issue behind the phrase "clear and
present danger."
Certainly no one would contend that
obscene speech,
for example, may be punished only
upon a showing of
such circumstances. Libel, as we have
seen, is in the
same class.

In New York Times*. however, the Court
carefully and emphatically dis-

tinguished the earlier dicta.

Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority

opinion, noted that "[n]one of the [previous]
cases sustained the use of

libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression
critical of the official
conduct of public officials."

The Court, he concluded, was "compelled

by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet
'libel'

than [it had] to other 'mere labels' of state law," so
that

states could not circumvent the principles of the amendment
merely by

labeling
stated,

certain expressions as "libel."

As the Court emphatically

libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional

limitations.

It must be measured by the standards that satisfy the

First Amendment."

19

But the New York Times case required no general rule on the consti-

tutional status of libel, for, while Sullivan alleged that he had been

11

libeled by the statements in the advertisement,
there were no specific

references to him in the advertisement at all.

It is doubtless true

that at least one statement was critical
of the actions of the Montgomery police, but could Alabama constitutionally
treat as libel false but

impersonal attacks on governmental policy or its
execution?
In setting the mood for its answer to this
question, the Court re-

sorted to the infamous Sedition Act of
1798, "which," the Court proclaimed, "first crystallized a national awareness
of the central meaning of the First Amendment."

The Sedition Act had provided for the

punishment, by fine and imprisonment, of anyone who criticized
the government of the United States, even without specific reference
to par-

ticular individuals.

Although the act was never challenged before the

Supreme Court, Justice Brennan asserted that its unconstitutionality
has carried the day in the court of history."^

Quoting Jaimes Madison,

the Court confirmed "that the censorial power is in the people over the

Government, and not in the Government over the people."

That no cri-

ticism of government could ever be proscribed was, therefore, the central meaning of the first amendment.

But, as applied, the Alabama

civil libel law permitted a public official successfully to claim enor-

mous damages because of an impersonal attack on his government's response to the civil rights movement.

Thus, the effect of the state

law was to punish seditious libel, and, moreover, to do so without the

safeguards of the criminal law, which would, presumably, have set limits
to the size of the "fine," and required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Professor Kalven suggests that the Court's opinion conveys the fol-

12

lowing syllogism:
xhe central meaning of the Amendment
is that seditious libel cannot be made the subject of
government sanction. The Alabama rule on fair
comment
is clearly akin to making seditious
libel an offense. The Alabama rule therefore violated
the
central meaning of the Amendment. 23

This was the cornerstone of the Court's opinion.
The Supreme Court could have disposed of the
Times case on this

ground alone.

Yet, had it done so, it would have left totally
unan-

swered the extremely important questions raised by
the case regarding
the right to direct personal criticism at the official
conduct of par -

ticular government officials.

And, on this point as well, the Court

was prepared to dismantle more of state libel law in order
to satisfy
the commands of the first amendment.

As Professor Kalven explains, the

Court was "carried along by a momentum of insight about the democratic
.

.

necessities of free speech."

24

Alabama's civil libel law, the Court indicated, created a privilege
that was clearly insufficient to guarantee protection for the freedom
of expression.

The state law compelled "the critic of official conduct

to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions

— and

pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount

.

result, the press could be forced into self-censorship.

.

to do so on
.

."

As a

"[W]ould-be

critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in

fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear

of the expense of having to do so."

25

The New York Times case, the Court acknowledged, must be seen "against

13

the backround of a profound national commitment to the
principle that

debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,

and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unplea-

santly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 20

But Ala-

bama's libel law effectively discouraged public criticism of official

behavior by not providing a safeguard sufficient to ensure the freedom of the press.

The Supreme Court, therefore, sought to establish a constitutional

rule regarding libel, in cases involving alleged defamation of public

officials, that would replace the narrow and imbalanced position held
by Alabama and the majority of the states, and that would permit and

encourage public dialogue.
In announcing its new constitutional doctrine, the Court held that

[t]he constitutional guarantees require ... a
federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct, unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice" that is, knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. ^7

—

This ruling thus incorporates into the first and fourteenth amend-

ments at least one aspect of the "minority" approach to civil libel
cases.

That is, the distinction between fact and comment or opinion,

in cases involving alleged defamation of "public officials," is held
to be irrelevant.

The "majority" privilege, such as that under Ala-

bama law, applied only to defamation arising from comment or opinion;
factual errors had no privilege.

But on this point, in hew iork Times ,

the Court adopted the view previously described as the "minority" posi-

tion.

In fact, arriving at the Times
doctrine, the Court relied

heavily on the reasoning in Coleman
v. MacLennan

.

cited above.

Under the New York Time s rule,
criticism of the official conduct
of
public officials retains the protection
of the first amendment, even
if false and defamatory, unless it
is made with "actual malice,"
defined by the Court as "knowing falsity"
or "reckless disregard" of the
truth.

"Malice" is not a concept unknown in the
field of libel.

privilege

m

The

both "majority" and "minority" states was
conditional

upon the absence of malice, defined as
"ill .will," "bad motive," and

sometimes as "negligence."

However, the Court's definition of "actual

malice" has little to do with malice, as that
word is defined in state
law.

In fact, the constitutional standard of Hew
York Times protects

malicious intent as long as the libeled person fails
to prove that the
defamer actually knew the falsity of his statements
or acted with reckless disregard of the truth.

The defamer

's

intentions are irrelevant,

unless, of course, they are helpful in ascertaining whether
he deliber-

ately lied or acted with reckless disregard of the truth.

As has been

noted:
No longer is [malice] a broad and obscure question of a publisher's motivations hatred, intent to injure, negligence, lacking an honest
opinion, without good faith, terms used for flexible definitions in the past. 2<^

—

ihe new constitutional standard of "actual malice" is a much more strict,

and less nebulous concept.

15

Alternative Approaches and Assessment
the Court's opinion in hew York Times was
not unanimous.

tices

Black, Douglas, and Goldberg

— thought

Three jus-

that the Court had not

gone far enough in extending constitutional protection
to expression.

Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, argued that
the first amendment provides an absolute privilege to criticize
official behavior.

"I

base my vote to reverse," he explained, "on the belief
that the First

and Fourteenth Amendments not merely 'delimit' a State's
power to award
damages to 'public officials against critics of their official
conduct' but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a
power.

Black, of course, would extend his absolutist interpretation of the

first amendment guarantees beyond the narrow scope of criticism of public officials.

The first amendment, he insisted, protects all speech

with absolute impunity.

Justice Goldberg also concurred with the Court's result, but not its
opinion.

Although not an absolutist in first amendment cases, Goldberg

insisted that the first amendment granted "an absolute, unconditional

privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow
from excessive abuses."

30

Goldberg would not, however, extend the ab-

solute privilege to defamatory statements aimed at the private affairs
of "public officials."

Both Justices Black and Goldberg criticized the Court's attaching
the condition of "actual malice" to the first amendment privilege to

criticize official behaviof.

They attacked the "actual malice" stan-

dard as a flexible and amorphous concept in the hands of a jury, espec-

16

ially a hostile jury.

"Malice," Justice Black complained,
"even as

defined by this Court, is an elusive, abstract
concept, hard to prove
and hard to disprove."

The conditional privilege, Black argued,

provides at best an evanescent protection for
the
right critically to discuss public affairs and
certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment.

Justice Goldberg also maintained that "[i]f individual
citizens may be
held liable in damages for strong words, which a jury finds
false and

maliciously motivated, there can be little doubt that public debate
and
advocacy will be constrained."^ 2

"The right [to criticize]," he argued,

"should not depend upon a probing by the jury of the motivation of the

citizen or press." 33
•

•

The Court's ruling, Goldberg charged, cannot

effectively safeguard freedom of expression because the standard of
"actual malice" allows "the imposition of liability upon a jury's eval-

uation of the speaker's state of mind."

34

There is considerable merit to the arguments of both Justices Black

and Goldberg.

Given the facts and circumstances of the case, it is dif-

ficult not to agree with Black's conclusion that

[t]his record certainly does not indicate that any
different verdict would have been rendered here
whatever the Court had charged the jury about "malice," "truth," "good motives," and "justifiable
ends," or any other legal formulas which in theory
would protect the press. Nor does the record indicate that any of these legalistic words would have
caused the courts below to set aside or reduce the
half-million dollar verdict in any amount. 35
The existence of hostile juries, or what has been described perhaps too

narrowly as the "southern jury problem," is quite real, as the facts of
the Times case dramatically attest.

It is not overstating the political

reality to assert that unfriendly criticism may be viewed in parts of
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the nation as "inherently"
motivated by "malice," however
legally defined.

The Court majority, of course,
recognized this problem.

The Court

was keenly aware of the circumstances
from which the Times case had

originated and the conditions possibly
awaiting the New York Times

Company on remand in Alabama.

Thus, after announcing the
constitutional

rule, the Court made its own examination
of the facts of the case to as-

sure that the Times doctrine would be
properly applied on remand.

In

doing so, however, it was confronted with
the seventh amendment, which
states that "no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise reexamined in

any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law."

But, aware of the susceptibility of legal
phrases to manipu-

lation and the situation in which the Times case
had arisen, the Court
insisted that its "duty is not limited to the elaboration
of constitutional principles; [it] must also in proper cases review
the evidence
to make certain that those principles have been
constitutionally ap-

plied."

Facts, the Court emphasized, are often intermingled with the

proper application of the law, and, therefore, the seventh amendment
"does not preclude us from determining whether governing rules of fed-

eral law have been properly applied to the facts.

Consequently, the Court reviewed the evidence and found for itself
that the statements in the Times advertisement did not refer to Sulli-

van and that the New York Times did not act with "actual malice," as

defined by the Court. 37

Thus, if Sullivan were to seek a new trial,

the Supreme Court, sitting, in effect, as jury, precluded the possi-

bility of a verdict for Sullivan.

18

De novo review of the facts of cases
has become a frequent aspect

of the Court's handling of libel.

In almost every libel case
which

has come before the Court since New York
Times , it has independently

examined the facts to determine for itself
whether the criteria for
"actual malice" have been met.

Some members of the Court have criti-

cized this procedure as an effort to constitutionalize
the fact-finding
process, and have chided the Court for acting "as
though it were a
jury

...

in flat violation of the Seventh Amendment.

'Tljt is

almost impossible to conceive," Justice Harlan cautioned,
"how this
Court might continue to function effectively were we to
resolve afresh
the underlying factual disputes in all cases containing
constitutional

issues."

39

Nevertheless, the Court has continued the process of de novo review
of the facts of such cases in order to ensure that constitutional

principles are applied.

And, indeed, the fact that the Court is will-

ing to review factual questions on appeal is, in the final analysis,
the only sure means of overcoming the problem of a hostile trial court
or jury.

Justice Black on the other hand has argued that the only sure method
is to make the constitutional protection absolute.

Commenting on the

Court's solution to the problem presented by the facts in New York Times
Justice Black has said:

In my opinion

the Federal Constitution has dealt
with this deadly danger to the press in the only
way possible without leaving the free press open
to destruction
by granting the press an absolute
immunity for criticism of the way public officials
do their public duty ... Stopgap measures like
those the Court adopts are in my judgment not
enough.

—

,
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But Black's solution, while giving complete license
to those who

choose to propagate deliberate lies, would not necessarily
solve the

proolem.

Surely, in view of the history of civil rights
litigation

in this country, it is no exaggeration to argue that a
hostile court

can create some reason for ruling any constitutional
doctrine inap-

plicable in specific cases. 42

Moreover, a person sued for damages

must respond in court, regardless of the degree of his constitutional

protection, and he must thereby incur the expense required for a legal
defense.

Black's solution, therefore, is by no means a cure-all for

the problems of guaranteeing freedom of the press.

Justice Goldberg's solution also purports to solve the problems
which confronted the Court in New York Times , but, in practice, his

position creates many difficulties.

First, for the same reasons that

Black's solution is no cure-all, Justice Goldberg's absolutism cannot

adequately deal with the problem of the hostile court and jury.

The

opportunity for appellate review is still necessary.
Second, Goldberg would limit the application of his unconditional

privilege to cases involving criticism of the public activity of public officials.

"This is not to say," he explained, "that the Constitu-

tion protects defamatory statements directed against the private conduct

of a public official or a private citizen."

43

The fundamental diffi-

culty here, of course, is determining when public conduct ceases and

private conduct begins.

Certainly some aspects of private behavior are

important for measuring the fitness for office of a public official.

Justice Goldberg conceded "that there will be a gray area.

The diffi-

culties of applying a public-private standard are, however," he concludes,
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"certainly of a different genre from those attending the
differentiation
between a malicious and nonmalicious state of mind ." 44

That distinction

seems facile. As will be shown in Chapter II, for purposes of
the New

_ —h

1

rule, private conduct and public conduct are not practically

distinguishable.

In cases subsequent to New York Times , the Court has

forthrightly ruled that anything that might help in measuring fitness
for office is clearly germane to the "official conduct" concept of the

Times doctrine.

45

The "gray area" which Justice Goldberg acknowledges

has, in practice, become substantially larger than he perhaps antici-

pated.

The distinction between private and public may be "of a dif-

ferent genre" from that between a malicious and nonmalicious state of
mind, but the practical distinction betv/een public and private is con-

siderably thinner than Justice Goldberg assumed.

Neither Black's nor Goldberg's approach adequately accommodates the

conflicting interests of freedom of the press and the protection of individual reputations.

Not only are both positions unable to guarantee

freedom of the press, but both would create the danger of converting
that freedom into a license to publish untruths.

Providing an absolute

privilege to criticize public officials, or, in Black's solution, an
absolute right to say anything, would encourage the dissemination of
untruth.

It is true, of course, that responsible journalists and

broadcasters would not engage in perniciously false muckraking.

But

some publishers might greet the absolute privilege with pleasure and

proceed to propagate scurrilous misinformation that could destroy
without reason the good names and careers of respectable citizens.
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Abuse of the freedom of the press is, of course, a necessary
con-

comitant

of the maintenance of a free flow of communication.

Some

falsehoods will inevitably result, and some must be shielded
by the
j-irst

amendment.

Speaking of inevitable falsehoods and abuse of free

press, James Madison said:

Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with
which it is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk without wounding vitally
the plant from which it is torn. However desirable
those measures might be which correct without enslaving the press, they have never yet been devised in
America. 4o
But it is one thing to allow the abuse and falsehood that is the in-

evitable result of uninhibited discussion; it is an altogether different

proposition to encourage deliberate lies.
agrees.

Justice Goldberg, of course,

However, he believes that a free press is too important in the

area of public discussion to condition its guarantee upon the failure
of a jury to find "actual malice," a requirement which would demand

probing the speaker's state of mind.

Goldberg insisted on his uncon-

ditional privilege, "despite the harm which might flow from excesses

and abuses."

47

Nevertheless, the abuses which accompany an absolute license to say

anything should be unwelcome in a free society.

A free press, of course,

is indispensable to the functioning of a free and democratic political

system.

But to fulfill its function, the press must be responsible.

Encouraging calculated falsehoods encourages irresponsibility.
Court notes, "the use of the known lie

...

As the

is at once at odds with

the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in
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which economic, social, or political change
is to be effected." 48

The

claim that abuses of the freedom of the press
must be accepted if that
freedom is to survive, reflects a failure to
consider other measures

which may more adequately deal with the interests
involved.
The Court's solution in hew York Times offers a
better balance of

interests, although the Times doctrine, also, fails
to consider an im-

portant dimension of the problems inherent in the conflict
between individual reputation and the freedom of expression.

Alfred H. Kelly has praised the New York Times opinion as,
"quite
clearly

.

.

.

one of the most libertarian affirmations of the Supreme

Court in the past several decades.

Indeed, the Court's strengthening

of the freedom of the press in that case was received with virtually

unanimous applause from law journals. 50
notes, in

i

.ew

York

i

As Thomas Emerson happily

imes , "the wall of separation betw'een libel and the

First Amendment [finally] came tumbling down." 51
The standard of liability imposed by the Court in cases of criticism
of the official conduct of public officials
less disregard" for the truth

standard.

— is

— "knowing

falsity" or "reck-

much narrower than any previous state

In theory, and even in practice, the Times standard amounts

to an absolute privilege responsibly to criticize official behavior.

Most newspapers and other media do not knowingly publish false statements.

Because of tradition, public pressure, expediency, or a sense

of honor and obligation, most journalists do not engage in conscious

lying in reporting and commenting on the news.
is "ideal for the newsman."

Thus the Times standard

It "entrenche[s] detractors of public

officials in their official capacities in positions virtually unassail-
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able by defamation actions."

safeguard,

As an "almost impervious" constitutional

the "actual malice" test provides the responsible
press

with an unconditional privilege to criticize the official
behavior of

puolic o^icials.

In short, as John P. MacKensie writes, the New York

limes doctrine establishes reportorial standards "more generous
and

permissive to the fourtn estate than the standards set by responsible
newspapers for themselves."
let, at the same time that the Court has given such broad protection

to the responsible press, it has not given constitutional immunity to

publishers who would deliberately lie.

Thomas Qnerson, who argues for

absolutism in all free speech cases except where speech encroaches upon
the right to "privacy ,

has maintained that, if the deliberate lie is

denied constitutional protection because it would deceive the public,

"exactly the same could be said of negligent false statements which
56

the Court does protect."^

Indeed, good faith errors, which must be

tolerated to ensure the free flow of information, may be as effective
as deliberate lies in disseminating incorrect information.

But the

fundamental and crucial distinction is that deliberate lies needlessly
injure individuals.

Surely, deliberate lies can be avoided without a

serious threat to the survival of a free press.

Currently, the press

does not enjoy an absolute, unconditional privilege to print anything
it chooses; however, I do not think that anyone would contend that the

press in this country is hovering on the brink of destruction.

Further-

more, it would not seem unreasonable to insist that the press function

with a minimum of responsibility and care.

57
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Professor Ihnerson continues his argument by saying
that "false
statements, whether intentional or not,

m

perform a significant function

a system of freedom of expression by forcing
citizens to defend,

justify and rethink their positions ." 58

Most people who are falsely

defamed may be able to "rethink their positions," but very
few have
the power to "defend" and "justify" their positions because
the

"marketplace" of ideas is a myth of the romantic era . 55

dividuals have ready access to the media.

Not many in-

In fact, as I shall discuss

below, most "public officials" cannot secure the necessary channels
to

rebut criticism made against them.

Aside from this, however,

I

think

that "truth" is a healthier and less dangerous stimulant than false-

hood to the exercise of public debate.

Only very indirectly does the

deliberate lie contribute to the effective flow of ideas; its direct
functions are to injure and misinform.

The advantage of protecting

the conscious lie is outweighed by the potential harm which it may

cause.

60

All this, of course, is not to say that the "actual malice" standard
is necessarily the perfect solution to the problems involved in recon-

ciling freedom of expression with the protection of the reputations of
individuals.

It is merely one attempt to provide a solution.

The most important shortcoming of the "actual malice" standard is
the difficulty of applying it to concrete cases.

The problem is not so

much with the "knowing falsity" aspect of the test, but with the meaning of "reckless disregard" for the truth.

In New York Times , the

Court itself applied the test to the facts at hand and found that the
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newspaper did not act with "actual malice."

But the application of the

test in that case does not reveal much about the meaning of "reckless

cisre ;ard.

i

ork

i

j.mes

was an "easy" case;, the facts would not ap-

pear to support even a finding of "negligence" against the newspaper.
It is true that in its files the Times had reports contradicting some

of the statements contained in the advertisement, but the court ruled
that "mere presence of

T

the reports] in the files does not

lish that the Times 'knew' the advertisement was false ." 01

...

estab-

"Reckless

disregard," then, is something other than failure to conduct a thorough
investigation.

Furthermore, those in the Times

organization responsible

for publishing the advertisement, as far as could be ascertained, acted
in good faith and thought that the contents of the advertisement were

true.

In later cases, the Court has attempted more fully to clarify the

meaning of "reckless disregard," despite the fact that the term cannot
be rigorously defined.

In the most recent case in which the Court

has discussed the meaning of the phrase, it was conceded that

"[ilnevitably its outer limits [must] be marked out through case-by-case

adjudication

.

.

.

."

However, the mere fact that a legal standard may not prove capable
of mechanical application in practice is not enough reason to abandon
it and substitute in its place, as do Justices Black and Goldberg, no

standard at all.

The entire structure of law is comprised of standards

and formulas which ordinary mortals must implement.

There is no guar-

antee, of course, that any standard will be properly applied in all

cases

— no

formula, for example, would have prevented a hostile trial

26

court and jury from "punishing" the Times .

But, as has been argued

earlier, not even Black's absolute privilege could eliminate
that

problem.
In s\im, the lev/ York Times rule undoubtedly enhanced freedom
of ex-

pression by providing the press with an absolute right to criticize
government in general and an absolute privilege responsibly to criticize
the official behavior of public officials.

Prior to New York Times

,

state

libel laws had added too much to libel at the expense of a free press,
and, as Justice Brennan stated, quoting from the famous libel case of

Sweeney v. Patterson , "Cw]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken
from the field of free debate."

64

But the converse is also true.
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Whatever is added to freedom of the

press is taken from the protection afforded to reputations.

Thus, in

balancing terminology, how substantial is the loss of protection for
reputations which results from the increase in the freedom of the press
established in New York Times ?

Has this increase been gained at too

great a sacrifice?
In answering this question, several points should be considered.

First, the Times doctrine totally ignores the wide range of positions
that might fall within the term "public official."

(This criticism,

of course, pertains also to Justice Goldberg's solution to the problem.)
In theory, the privilege to criticize public officials may be made

broad because the public official is not left "without defenses against

unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements

...

The public

official certainly has equal if not greater access than most private
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citizens to the media of communications."" 0

This is no doubt generally

true, but there is a wide gap between the capacity of a
United States

Senator, for example, to respond and the capacity of some
obscure, unknown, low-level bureaucrat.

Access to the media is not an automatic

tringe benefit for all those who are called "public officials."
ihe inomas magle ton— Jack Anderson affair in the 1972 presidential

campaign provides an excellent example of a public official with instant access to the media,

-but

not all officials are vice-presidential

candidates constantly in the public eye.

The New York Times rule would

have applied equitably had litigation arisen from this controversy.
However, that same rule might apply unequitably in the case of an anony-

mous bureaucrat who is falsely defamed and without a meaningful means
of response.

My criticism anticipates, of course, that a low-level bureaucrat
would fall under the "public official" designation.

The Court, in

New York Times , avoided defining the full scope of that concept.

But,

taking the words directly, a public official is anyone who holds a public office.

Yet, even within this range, there is an enormous variation

both in the kinds of offices and the power of response available to
those who fill those offices.

In short, the Times doctrine indiscrim-

inately provides the same amount of protection to persons criticizing
any public official without considering the capacity of the defamed

official adequately to respond.
Furthermore, the distinction between public and private conduct has

proved in practice to be impossible to locate. ^

Thus if a critic

claims that a low-level official is a sexual pervert, there is nothing
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Hie _cj£ r cr.'.
sii.ce it
u0

l

imes rule that would make it inapplicable,
particularly

may oe argued that the question of his perversion is
relevant

ohe issue o

;

his fitness for office.

Unless the official has the

means successfully to counter this attack, which is unlikely,
he may
suffer unjust harm, while those hearing only the defamation are left

misinformed.
I

think an entirely different situation arises if that same attack

were erroneously made against the President of the United States.

He

has the means and public prestige, not only to repudiate the defamation,
but also to make a fool of his critic.

But the New York Times doctrine,

at least by its own terms, would apply equally to both cases

— resulting,

it would appear, in equally unfair results.

In terms of the interests involved, no better remedy exists than that

the defamed should have the right of reply immediately to respond with

countercriticism refuting the defamatory statements made against him.
The payment of damages, by itself, is no substitute for the real injury caused by defamation.

Of course, there may be some defamed per-

sons who would rather have the financial damages than have their repu-

tations restored.

Furthermore, damage actions usually require many

months of litigation.

By that time, most of those hearing the charges

have lost interest in the matter, although not the memory of the de-

famatory statements.
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As many students of libel law have been urging

for years, the right of immediate reply ought to supplement the law of

libel .

69

In a very perceptive analysis of the freedom of expression, Jerome
A. Barron writes that

/
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t]he irony of Times and its progeny lies in
the unexamined assumption that reducing news-

paper exposure to libel litigations will remove restraints on expression and lead to an
"informed society"
Unless the Times
doctrine is deepened to require opportunities
for the. public figure [and private person] to
reply to a defamatory attack, the Times decision will merely serve to equip the press with
some new and rather heavy artillery which can
crush as well as stimulate debate. 7°

....

"What the Court has done," Barron argues, "is to magnify the power of
one of the participants in the communications process with apparently
no thought of imposing on newspapers concomitant responsibilities to

assure that the new protection will actually enlarge and protect op-

portunities for expression."
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Viewed from this perspective, the Court has elevated the freedom
of the press to criticize public officials, while those at the mercy
of the press have no means of rebuttal unless they are high-level

officials with considerable access to the media.
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When the managers

of the communications industry exercise a substantial influence on what

can be expressed, the free speech guarantee becomes one-sided.

That

guarantee, Barron concludes, must not only recognize a free speech
right, but must also provide for it,
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either by statute or by judi-

cial creation of a concomitant free speech right.

The right of reply should be made an integral part of the law of
libel.

It is the most finely tuned instrument for bringing the in-

terests in reputation and free expression into a more harmonious

balance of interests.

Equipped with the right of reply, the defamed

individual would have the opportunity immediately to counter defamatory allegations made against him.

His channel of response would be
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the same specific channel which published the defamation.

Thus, for

example, a person defamed by a local newspaper would be
assured the

right immediately to reply through that same newspaper.

The right

would require the publisher to provide the opportunity for rebuttal.
Surely, of course, this requirement would apply only to established

media of communications.

For example, if an individual were defamed

by a person distributing mimeographed hand-bills, the right of reply

would not apply.

The purpose of the right pertains more clearly to

established newspapers, magazines, and the broadcasting media.
To be sure, the right of reply will not remove the conflict, but
it would assure a better accommodation between two inherently conflict-

ing social interests.

It is perhaps the only means of practically real-

izing the "marketplace” of ideas concept, if realization can be attained
at all.

If the defamed public official, whether a low-level bureau-

crat or the President of the United States, can adequately respond in

defense, the application of the "actual malice" standard would result
in much less destruction of the social interest in protecting reputations

than would the Court's balance in New York Times .
The difficulty with the right of reply lies in its promulgation and

implementation.
ply.

Some states, by statute, already provide a right of re-

But there is no obstacle in the way of reading into the first

amendment, the right to reply to defamatory criticism.
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After all,

the first amendment says nothing about "actual malice;" that standard
is a judicial artifact, designed to balance interests.

A better bal-

ance, however, would be to rule that the first amendment provides public officials, unjustly defamed, with the right to respond in defense.
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Granting a right oi reply to all public officials
would not mean
that critics would thereafter be free deliberately
and falsely to attack public officials with impunity, provided the
officials have open

channels to counter the attack.

That situation would, again, encourage

the untruth from irresponsible critics seeking to injure
and generate

falsehoods.

Therefore,

I

would make the right of reply only a first

step in the process of vindicating the reputations of the defamed.

In

other words, if the defamed public official believes that he was inten-

tionally and falsely defamed, he can take his case to court.

And, if

it can be proven that the publisher of the defamation acted with

"actual malice," as defined by the Court, then damages can be awarded.
Thus, the right of reply would only be a supplement to the law; it

would not be a final, all-embracing solution.

The "actual malice"

•

standard must be made part of the law to deter the irresponsible functioning of the press.

Nevertheless, the supplement of the right of re-

ply would better accommodate the conflict of interests than would the
Court's sweeping doctrine announced in New York Times .

Rather than the first amendment, a more practical ground for the
right of reply should come from a statute, either state or federal.
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But, if only a handful of states are willing through statutes to pro-

vide this right, and Congress does not enact a federal statute, the

Court should insist that free speech can be meaningful only when all

participants in the communications process have at least a minimal response capability, especially when they are defamed.

As the Court can

create the "actual malice" standard, it can as ‘well create the right of

reply as a prerequisite to the initiation of a libel suite.

In other
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words, when a person is defamed, it would become incumbent
upon the
Oi

ohe defamation to allow the defamed to respond.

Implement ition of the right of reply is not impractical.

Many

European and Latin American countries provide that right without a
strain on the functioning of the communications industry.

And, cur-

rently, there is a growing recognition of the need for and the possibillty of a right of reply. 77

It is the only solution which focuses directly

on the central facet of the conflict of interests.

The utility of a right of reply does not benefit only the defamed.
It might prevent many libel cases from going to court, a process which

is not only time consuming, but very often quite expensive.

in Henry Ford's famous libel suit

found in favor of Ford. 79

against the Chi carp Tribune

In 1917,
,

the jury

But in view of the newspaper's good faith,

the amount awarded in damages was only six cents.

Yet in defending it-

self against Ford the Chicago Tribune invested over $500,000, the amount
in damages awarded to Commissioner Sullivan by the Alabama courts against
the New York Times .

Had an effective right of reply been available, the

Chicago Tribune might have avoided the enormous expense invested in its
defense.

Although Justice Brennan and the Court majority recognized the profound need for uninhibited debate on "public issues," the Times rule
was specifically limited to criticism aimed at the official conduct
of public officials.

The most important question following New York

Times was whether the Court would eventually extend the application of
its constitutional doctrine to other kinds of potentially libelous
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speecn

that is, to speech involving important
public matters, but not

involving the o^icial conduct of public officials.
.'n ting shortly after hew York Times, Willard
H. Pedrick argued that

"the limitation .of the hew York Times doctrine
to defamation of "public

officials"] is not compatible with the base on which
the announced federal privilege rests-the first amendment. c0

Surely, if debate on pub-

lic issues is to be "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open," as the Court

stated, then the privilege to criticize must be extended
beyond the limited category established by the Court in its opinion in
New York Times.

Pedrick predicted that "Ci]t is difficult to believe that the
Court will
adhere to the announced limitation of the privilege

....

The de-

termination of 'matters of public concern,'" he concluded, would perhaps become "the key to the application of the privilege. dl

As a

matter of fact, the Court has extended the constitutional protection far
beyond the boundaries of the rule announced in New York Times.

And, as

Pedrick predicted, it appears as if the criterion for application of the
"actual malice" standard is evolving towards a determination of "matters
of public concern."
As to the specific rule in New York Times

unanswered in the Court' s opinion.
1

ficial?"

,

many questions were left

Who, for example, is a "public of-

How far down the ranks of public office-holders and other

governmental employees does the rule apply?

When is conduct related to

official duty and when is it a purely private affair?
tions to which the Court offered no guidance.
of cases since New York Times

,
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These are ques-

However, in a series

it has made an effort to elaborate on its

constitutional doctrine, and has further revised the constitutional law
of libel.

POST-NEW YORK TIMES DEVELOPMENT: APPLICATION OF
THE RULE
A constitutional rule or doctrine displays its
full meaning only as

applied in practice.

This chapter will focus on the Supreme Court's

implementation of the New York Times rule as it has been
clarified and

reformulated in subsequent cases.

Discussion will be confined almost

entirely to cases decided by the Court, although most of the
reconstruction of the Times doctrine has originated in many lower federal
and

state courts.

Supplied with little guidance from the Court in New York

limes , the lower courts have been forced to initiate new approaches
for

applying the Times doctrine to various circumstances.
This chapter has been divided into a number of sections, each focusing
on an aspect of the Times rule as originally constructed, and as supple-

mented and reconstructed through subsequent cases.

"Official Conduct"

Balancing the conflicting interests in New York Times

,

the Supreme

Court ruled that a public official's interest. in protecting his reputation outweighs the interest in public debate only in the area of his

purely private affairs or in the case of reckless disregard of the truth.
His interest in protecting his reputation as it relates to his official

conduct is, however, overborne, by the interest in public debate, as long
as public debate is responsible.

opinion in New York Times

,

Justice Goldberg, in his concurring

claimed that "Ci]n most cases

...

there

will be little difficulty in distinguishing defamatory speech relating
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to private conduct from that relating to official conduct."

He rec-

ognized, of course, a "gray area" in which conduct of both overlap.

Clearly, criticism which is directed at the manner in which a public

Oificial discharges his official duties falls within the constitutional

protection created by New York Times .

Responsible criticism, for in-

stance, which castigates a governor's implementation of a particular

welfare program is surely protected by the Times ruling. But suppose,
for example, that it was reported falsely, but not deliberately, that an

important public officeholder who supervised the control of alcoholic

beverages had been arrested several times for drunk driving.

Would such

a false and obviously defamatory publication be privileged under the rule

established in New York Times?

No doubt it would be privileged because

whether the public official was a drunk driver is certainly relevant to
the performance of his duties concerning the governmental control of al-

coholic beverages.

Although the alleged arrests would have been made

against the public official as a private person, they unquestionably
have a potential bearing on the position which the public official

holds in the government.
The private life of an official is very often related to his official

behavior.

Private conduct frequently has an important impact upon the

official behavior of a public official.

The honesty and integrity that

he exhibits in his private affairs is certainly germane to an assessment
of his integrity in office.

In New York Times, the Court simply distin-

guished between official and private conduct witnout defining either.
public
The problem, however, is not simply one of distinguishing between
some potential
and private conduct, since almost every private action has

connection with official behavior.

latmp

The problem is, rather, one of iso-

pure-Ly private matters from private matters
which have some rea-

sonable relevance to official behavior.

However, similar to the problem

of obscenity, the categories are impossible to
define except through a

case-by-case procedure.

The Court acknowledged that a category of purely

private behavior exists, but is at a loss to define it.

Perhaps the

Court has learned from its past attempts legally to define
obscenity.

After ten years of fumbling with definitions the Court was depicted
by
one critic as the "Tower of Babel."

In New York Times , the Court re-

frained from defining official and private conduct.

But, in later cases,

although continuing to avoid specific definitions, the Supreme Court
has tried to explain the meaning of "official conduct."
In Garrison v. Louisiana , decided eight months after New York Times
,

the Court made its first attempt to elaborate the meaning of "official

conduct."^

James Garrison, a district attorney in Louisiana, was con-

victed of violating the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute.

At a

press conference he had accused several state court judges of inefficiency, laziness, of taking excessive vacations, of hampering his own

efforts to enforce the vice laws in New Orleans, and of possible subjection to "racketeer influences."

On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court

ruled that Garrison's statements we re not criticisms of "official conduct," but were personal attacks on the integrity and honesty of the
judges.

5

However, the Supreme Court held that Garrison's criticism could not
"be considered as one constituting a purely private defamation.

The ac-

cusation concerned the judges' conduct of the business of the Criminal

District Court ."

0

Speaking through Justice Brennan, the Court explained:
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iae ^_ew lork Times rule is not rendered
inapplicable
merely uecause an official’s private reputation,
as
as
Public reputation, is harmed. The publicOxxicial rule protects the paramount public
interest
a freeflow of information to the people
concerning
public officials, their servants. To this end,
anything
which might touch on an official's fitness for
office
is relevant.

m

Without specifically defining "official conduct," the
Court argued
tnat there

v/as

"no difficulty in bringing [Garrison's] statement
within

purview of criticism of the official conduct of public
officials,

jdie

entitled to the benefit of the New York Times rule."

O

"Few personal

attributes," the Court explained, "are more germane to fitness for
office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though
these characteristics may also affect the official's private character."^

The Supreme Court cited Coleman v. MacLennan where, speaking of candidates, the Kansas Supreme Court said that "a candidate must surrender so

much of his private character as affects his fitness for office

.

."

.

0

Applying the same reasoning to public officials, the Supreme Court ruled
that

" anything

relevant."’

‘

which might touch on an official's fitness for office is
But, surely it would be difficult to find an aspect of an

official's private life which does not "touch on" his fitness for office.
Not until seven years later did the Court again confront the meaning
of "official conduct."

In Monitor Patriot Co . v. Roy

,

the Court held

"that a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or

place, can never be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fit-

ness for office for purposes of application of the 'knowing falsehood
or reckless disregard' rule of New York Times Co . v. Sullivan ."

Monitor Patriot Co.

,

a newspaper published a column

In

characterizing

Alphonse Roy, a senatorial candidate, as a "former small-time bootlegger."
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Roy lost the election and sued the newspaper and the distributor
of the
column for libel.
the

The jury found that the statement did not relate
to

official conduct

11

of the candidate, and, therefore, returned a

verdict in favor of Roy. ^

Justice Stewart, who delivered the opinion of the Court, argued that
the distinction between public and private conduct, when apnlied to a

candidate for office, is practically meaningless.

"Indeed," the Court

reasoned, "whatever vitality the 'official conduct' concept may retain

with regard to occupants of public office

...

it is clearly of little

applicability in the context of an election campaign."
places his entire self before the electors.

A candidate

"Given the realities of

our political life," the Court admitted, "it is by no means easy to see
what statements about a candidate might be altogether without relevance
to his fitness for the office he seeks."

15

Thus, the Court was announcing that, at least in relation to candidates
for office, there is almost no distinction between public and private

conduct.

"[W]hether there remains some exiguous area of defamation

against which a candidate may have full recourse is a question," the
Court concluded, "we need not decide in this case."

1

The Court, therefore,

left open the possibility that there may be a very few instances which

relate to the purely private life of a candidate for office.

The thrust

of the Court's opinion, however, implies that until a case actually

involving a purely private defamation is brought before the Court, the
distinction between criticism of public conduct and that of private
behavior is constitutionally irrelevant.

As the Court itself has argued,
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ohe teGt has Sone "far beyond the customary
meaning of the phrase
'

ficial conduct.
.in

—

"

o^nr- Banner Co. v. Damron, decided the same
day as Monitor

il CL-.lu.

—

1

'of-

1

the Court claimed that "Cp]ublic discussion about
the qual-

ifications oi a candidate for elective office presents
what is probably
the strongest possible case for application of the New
York Times
~~
„i8
.
T
rule.
However, as I have argued, the compass of what is relevant
in

measuring fitness for office does not depend on whether the
subject is
a candidate or office-holder.
^.Qfl^tor

Patriot Co .

,

Indeed, the Court in Garrison

,

and again in

expressed the broadest possible meaning of "offi-

cial conduct" in ruling that "anything which might touch on an official's

fitness ior oifice" lies within the scope of the concept. ^

In other

words, the range of the term is practically without limit, if the subject is either a public official or candidate for office.

Court stated in Monitor Patriot Co.

,

And, as the

"it is by no means easy to see what

statements about a candidate [or office-holder] might be altogether
without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks."

20

In conclusion, it would appear that the distinction between official

and private conduct, once a component part of the New York Times rule,
is no longer constitutionally significant.

The scope of the "official

conduct" concept has been stretched to include every area of private
life which has any conceivable connection with the public performance
of a political office.

If there is a purely private area lying beyond

the boundaries of the reformulated meaning of "official conduct," the

Court has wisely, perhaps necessarily, neglected to define it, except
to say that if such exists, its range is "exiguous."
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In applying New York Times to the facts
in Monitor Patriot Co.,
the

Court rightly argued that candidates
for office must, and often
willingly,

expose all of themselves which is relevant
in appraising their fitness
for office.

But this argument, of course, applies
with equal force to

"public officials," as well as candidates for
office.

The category of

qualities relevant for fitness in office does
not depend on whether the

person is seeking or already holding that office.

In Monitor Patriot Co.,

the respondent, Alphonse Roy, was a candidate
for office, and the Court's

argument was impelled by this fact.

Yet the Court's failure to state

that its ruling applies to officials as well as
candidates leaves open
^ne anomalous possibility that candidates may
be criticized more freely

tnan puolic officials.

But, laced with a case squarely raising this

issue, it is not likely that the Court would make this
anomalous distinction.

Thus, in Monitor Patriot Co . v. Roy , the Supreme Court greatly

expanded the "official conduct" component of Mew York Times, as it applies
to both "public officials" and candidates for office.
xhe

1

official conduct" concept of New

i

ork Times has become nothing

more than a phrase designating any conduct or factor which may be relevant
in measuring a person's fitness for public office.

When first announced

in New York Times , the constitutional rule was derived from the facts

of the Times case; there, the criticism was directed at the official

activities of Commissioner Sullivan.

In Garrison and Monitor Patriot Co .

the Court's elaboration of "official conduct" has extended the concept
to include anything , both public and private, which increases the public's

capacity to assess a person's fitness, as both candidate and office-holder.

4l

"Public Officials"

A second component of the New York Times
rule was the "public official"

concept.

In _nw .£ork Times, the Court avoided
specifying the limits of

tne "public official" designation.

Lower courts were, therefore, left

free to determine for themselves how New York
Times was to be applied.

Jut 1 in a series of cases subsequent to Times
the Court elaborated the
,

meaning of the "public official" concept, as it did with
the meaning
of "official conduct," by stretching its boundaries
in case after case.
-ihe

process began with an attempt to specify which office-holders
in

government qualify as "public officials" under the New York Times
rule.
The process has now temporarily ended in a divided Court with
at least
four justices convinced of the "artificiality, in terms of the
public's

interest, 01 a simple distinction between 'public' and 'private' indi—

viduals or institutions." 22
The "public official" concept by itself, I think, is explicit enough
to include at least elected officials and appointees such as judges and

commissioners.

And, as revealed in Monitor Patriot Co . v. Roy , candi-

dates for elected office clearly qualify as "public officials" with

respect to the New York Times rule.

23

But, as with the "official conduct

element, there is, to borrow Justice Goldberg's expression, a "gray

area," unless the Times rule applies to all persons on the public payroll
In Rosenblatt v. Baer , decided two years after New York Times , the

Court announced a test for delimiting the extent of the "public official"
concept.

24-

Baer had been a supervisor of a New Hampshire county recrea-

tion area and was employed by county officials.

He initiated a libel

suit against Rosenblatt, a columnist, who had allegedly intimated that

42

Baer had mismanaged the recreation area.

One of the questions before

tne Supreme Court was whether Baer was a "public
official" under the
i^ew

York Times doctrine.

tne case went

'co

But, since New York Times was decided
after

trial, the Court held that Baer should have
been permitted

to adduce proof that his libel suit fell outside the
perimeter of the
1 rnes
.

.

'

r al e *

.

The case was therefore reversed and remanded so that
"the

crial judge in tne first instance

...

L

could] determine whether the

proofs show [Baer] to be a 'public official.'" 2 ^
However, in this

case, the Supreme Court fashioned a test to help

lower courts determine whether certain persons are "public officials"
for purposes of New York Times .

First, the Court rejected the argument

that whether a person is a "public official" should be determined by
state-lav; standards.

26

"States," the Court explained, "have developed

definitions of 'public official' for local administrative purposes,
not for purposes of a national constitutional protection." 2 ^

If state

law were the standard, the Court reasoned, the "public official" concept

would vary from state to state.

Although Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion is Rosenblatt
stated that "[n]o precise lines need be drawn for the purposes of this
case,"

23

he nevertheless projected a rather sweeping test.

He wrote:

There is, first a strong interest in debate on public
issues, and, second, a strong interest in debate about
those persons who are in a position significantly to
influence the resolution of those issues ... It
is clear, therefore, that the "public official"
designation applies at the very least to those among
the hierarchy of government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility^
for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.

,

I*,

should be noted, first, that the Court's test includes
"government

employees," not just elected officials.
included within the meaning
v. Roy,

(Candidates for office were

of "public official" in Monitor Patriot Co.

decided five years after Rosenblatt .)

Second, the Court's test

signij.ies only "the very least" of what might be included in
the "public

concept.

The test, in other words, incorporates much more

into the "public official" concept than ordinary language would signify.

Furthermore, "persons who are in a position significantly to influence
the resolution 01

...

U

public] issues

just government officials and employees.

.

.

." clearly number more than

As Justice Douglas

commented,

how about those who contract to carry out governmental missions? Some of them are as much in the
public domain as any so-called office-holder ...
And the industrialists who raise the price of a
basic commodity? Are not steel and aluminum in the
public domain? And the labor leader who combines
trade unionism with bribery and racketeering? Surely
the public importance of collective bargaining puts
labor as well as management into the public arena so
far as the present constitutional issue is concerned.
The Court, no doubt under pressure from Justice Douglas' criticism,

attempted to restrict the possible implications of its test by further
expounding on what was meant by the term "public official."

It

continued:

Where a position in government has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent
interest in the qualifications and performance of
the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees, both elements
we identified in New York Times are present^and
the New York Times malice standards apply.
In this passage, the meaning of "public official" is limited to persons

holding "position!) s] in government."

But the test, as framed by the

Court majority through Justice Brennan, "applies
at the very least"
to tnose employees of the government who
have substantial impact on

public issues,

ourely, such a test invited speculation,
as Justice

Douglas demonstrated, as to what may be beyond "the
very least" meaninDl

tne "P ublic official" concept.

The Supreme Court seemed to be hinting

at a much broader meaning of "public official" within
the context of
_jrw Y ork

Times.

The interjection of the phrase "public issue" in all

the Court's explanations of what it meant in New York Times
may suggest
that, as one observer noted, "the Supreme Court viewed the
cial' and

'public offi-

'public issue' categories as coterminous."^ 2

Lower courts were thus encouraged by Rosenblatt to implement the
sweeping, but uncertain, definition of "public official" announced there,
at least until the Court could construct a less nebulous extension of
the "public official" concept.

There is no question that the Court was

expanding the purview of the "public official" component of the Times
rule.

The problem for interpreters, of course, was "how much" and

"how far."

A year after Rosenblatt , however, the Court, through an unusual

procedure of judicial rule-making, specifically extended the "public
official" designation to include "public figures." 33

Thus, the consti-

tutional protection accorded to the press in New York Times was magnified as the Court enlarged the scope of the "public official" concept.
And, in so doing, the Court moved the principle of the New York Times

doctrine closer to the "public issue" criterion.
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From "Public Officials" to "Public Figures"

Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Rosenblatt
criticized the
Court's artificial distinction between "public" and
"private" with

regard to persons who exert substantial impact on the
outcome of public
issues.

The president of a mammoth corporation which
produces some of

the basic necessities of life, for example, certainly
has an impact on
a variety o: public issues.

As such, he exercises considerable power —

more, perhaps, than the average "public official."
In Curuis r'ublisning Co . v. Butts , decided together with
Associated
i +

0 ^^

v .

..

,-L-^er

,

tne supreme oourt was faced with the constitutional

question whether the reach of New York Times extends to libel actions
brought not by "public officials," but by "public figures."

Wally Butts,

a prominent figure in college sports, who was employed as athletic director

at the University of Georgia, sued the Curtis Publishing Company for

printing an alleged libel in the Saturday- Evening Post .

The article

accused Butts of conspiring to "fix" a football game between the Universities of Alabama and Georgia.

In Associated Press v. Walker, General

Walker, retired from the military but politically active, sued the

Associated Press for printing a new dispatch which described him as
encouraging riot and violence on the campus of the University of

Mississippi while federal troops sought to enforce a court order to
enroll a black student at the university.
In applying New York Times between 1964 and 196?, lower courts

v/ere

divided in many cases in their interpretations of the applicability of
the Times doctrine.

34

The division and confusion within the lov/er courts

was, no doubt, spawned, at least in part, by the Court's ambiguous efforts
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to elaborate the reach of New York Times
.

Butts and Talker provided the

Court with another opportunity to clarify the
constitutional meaning of

—

by specifying the limits of its applicability.
The Supreme

Court, nov/ever, divided in a most unusual manner.

Justice Karlan,

joined oy Justices Clark, Fortas, and Stewart, announced
the judgments
of the Court in both cases; Chief Justice Warren, in
a concurring opinion,

joined in part by Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and
White, announced
a new constitutional ruling, at least as it applied
to the Walker case.

Justice Harlan distinguished Butts and Walker from New York
Times,

arguing that "itlhese actions cannot be analogized to prosecutions
for
seditious lioel.

Neither plaintiff has any position in government which

would permit a recovery by him to be viewed as a vindication of govern-

mental policy." 35

It should be recalled that the ruling in New York

? imes prohibited states from punishing through civil libel laws, imper-

sonal criticism of government.

Coupled with the protection for this

type of criticism was a further constitutional protection for criticism

directed at the official conduct of identifiable public officials.
I

As

have argued above, the Court's opinion in Rosenblatt extended, although

in ambiguous language, the application of New York Times .

The thrust

of the Court's progression since New York Times was a widening of the

ambit of constitutional protection.

The core protection, in Kalven's

terms, was "the central meaning" of the freedom of speech, that govern-

ment may not punish seditious libel.

The next concentric circle, to

use another of Kalven's descriptions, established protection for criticism

of particular public officials.

In Rosenblatt , the Court created another

circle broadening the ambit of protection by broadening the category
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bounof "public officials," but the Court's opinion did not define the

daries of that category.

36

Harlan's attempt to distinguish Butts and Walker from New York Times
punishment
focused on only the "core" constitutional protection against

His opinion, in other words, sought to reverse

for seditious libel.

had taken since New York
the direction which constitutional decisions
Times.

Instead of reading the New York Times rule as having Soill

interpretation to the first
broader application, Harlan gave a narrow
Times.
amendment principle established in New York

57

construed the meaning of New York Times
in Rosenblatt,
—

Justice Stewart,

m

the same way.

/

in New York Times "should not
There he wrote that the rule announced

law of defamation has been unconstibe applied except where a State's

seditious libel,"
tutionally converted into a law of

althougn, on

justices, including Justice Harlan,
the same day, he joined four other

standard to a company official involved
in applying the "actual malice"
in a labor dispute.
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was
standard announced in New York Times
Thus, the "actual malice"
a narrow -uea
as being applicable only .0
read by at least two Justices
of libelous speech.

however, interpreted
The more liberal Justices,

by ijw 12X1
core of the protection offered
that narrow area as only the
the absoluteness
Douglas sat alone advocating
Times. Justices Black and

of first amendment protection.
to
balance of interests was needed
To Harlan, a new constitutional
need to provide
figures." He recognized the
cover the case of "public

since
aimed at public figures,
constitutional protection for criticism
questions of public
influence the resolution of
these persons very often
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concern.

Considerations of the "similarities and
differences" involved,

he therefore argued, "lead us to the conclusion
that libel actions of
tne present klnd cannot be left entirely to state
libel laws, unlimited
by any overriding constitutional safeguard,
but that the rigorous fed-

eral requirements of New York Times are not the only
appropriate accomo-

dation of the conflicting interests at stake."

He continued:

We consider and would hold that a "public figure"
who is not a puolic official may also recover damages ior a de i amatory falsehood whose substance makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an
extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible

publishers.

Analysing Justice Harlan's words, one might seriously contend that
his new standard is no different from the New York Times "actual malice"
standard, at least the "reckless disregard" aspect of it.

In the words

of one observer,

perhaps it is only a useless exercise in semantics
to attempt to distinguish "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting usually (sic)
adhered to by responsible publishers" from the "reckless disregard of the truth" which constitutes the
second half of the "actual malice" definition.
However, in another part of his opinion, Harlan discusses "ordinary tort

rules" and the "reasonable man" analogy involving tort liberty,
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ex-

plaining that negligent conduct which injures another has ordinarily
been measured by what a "reasonable man" might expect to be normal stan-

dards of care.

But it must be emphasized that Harlan never specifically

stated the manner in which his standard was to be applied, although it
is clear that he was opting for a standard less rigorous than the Hew

^9

~~~

2i2£s "actual malice" standard.

Instead of words connoting

simple negligence, as interpreted
traditionally in tort law, the
language
Harlan's new standard might be said to
connote "gross

m

negligence," in the words of one commentator."" 5

Nevertheless, Jus-

tice Harlan was attempting to create
a lower, less stringent stan-

dard than "actual malice" for cases involving
the alleged defamation
of "public figures."

And, it was this fact which prompted
both Jus-

tices Black and Douglas to concur with Chief
Justice Warren in

—L-

er ln order t0 prevent Harlan's less
rigid standard from command-

ing a plurality of the Court.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren
criticized the

elusive character of Harlan's standard.

"I cannot believe," Warren

countered, "that a standard which is based on such an
unusual and

uncertain formulation could either guide a jury of laymen
or afford
the protection for speech and debate that is fundamental
to our soci-

ety and guaranteed by the First Amendment.

He further attacked

Harlan's position by criticizing the "differentiation between 'public figures' and 'public officials' and the adoption of separate

standards of proof for each" as having "no basis in law, logic, or
First Amendment policy."

ko

If the interest in conflict with libel

laws is the need for free public discussion of public issues

,

I

would

agree with the Chief Justice in characterizing as illogical Harlan's

distinction between "public officials" and "public figures," for both
can often equally influence the outcome of public issues.

On occasion,

a "public figure" has more power than does a "public official' in re-
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solving questions. of public importance.

Furthermore the "public

official" has an interest no less than that of a
"public figure,"
in safeguarding his reputation.

m

.ho opinion, Justice Harlan stated "tnat the public
interest

in the circulation of the materials here involved, and the
publish-

er's interest in circulating them, is not less than that involved
47
Nop 1 ork .ir.ies .
But, if the interests in free speech in Butts

m

11

and Walker are no less important than in New York Times , why should
the standards of liability be different?

Furthermore, Harlan con-

ceded, both Butts and Walker "commanded sufficient continuing public

interest and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument
to be able

'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies'

of the defamatory statements."

48

Not all "public officials," however,

have such ready and "sufficient access" to the media to counter criticism; and, yet, the more rigorous "actual malice" standard of New

York Times applies equally to all "public officials."

Moreover, some

"public figures" undoubtedly have more access to the press than do

many low-level "public officials."
Chief Justice 'Warren was joined in part by Justices Black, Brennan,
Douglas, and White;

49

his position, therefore, extending the applica-

tion of the New York Times rule, broadened the constitutional ambit
of first amendment protections.

The standard of "actual malice" ap-

plied to criticism of both "public officials" and "public figures."
Like New York Times , however, the Walker case, from which the con-

stitutional ruling emerged, created at least as many problems as it

51

solved.

First, the problem of identifying
"public figures" is, per-

haps more difficult than that of
identifying "public officials."

fhe

passages in Warren's opinion which
became the basis of the constitutional extension of Few York Times to
"public figures," were limited
to three pages of the United States
Retorts .

Warren did not specif-

ically explain how judges were to recognize
"public figures" for pur-

poses of applying Few York Times.

He did offer some guidance, however,

in pointing to the importance of "public
figures" within the context

of matters of public concern.
In many situations, policy determinations
which
traditionally were channeled through formal poli oical institutions are now originated
and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the Government. This blending of positions and power
has also occurred in the case of individuals so
that many who do not hold public office at the
moment are nevertheless intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions
or, by reason of their fame, share events in areas
of concern to society at large.
A definition of "public figure," as deciphered from the few
relevant

passages in Warren's opinion, therefore, is one who is either famous in
an area of public concern or a person "intimately involved" in the outcome of public issues.

And, "surely as a class," Warren added, "these

'public figures' have as ready access as 'public officials' to mass

media 01 communication, both to influence policy and counter criticism
of their views and activities."
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As vague as this description of "public figures" appears to be, it
is, perhaps, as concrete as any other that would be broad enough to

provide adequate protection.

The term "public figure" can be given

practical rneanin ' only
ixy through
rp^e> n
T
-o^n aa caseoy-ca.se
method of examining the
position of each potential "public figure."
'

-,

l

,

Lower courts have been forced to
interpret the limits of the
"nublie figure" cor.cept. Judge J. Skelly
Wright has defined "public figures" as "persons, who, independent
of the publication in question,

occupy some place in the public spotlight,
although not in a position
of governmental responsibility ." 52

Such a definition, however, is

even more vague than the description extracted
from Warren's opinion

m

Butts and Walker.

Summarizing the alternative approaches taken
by

lower courts in applying New York Times

,

one observer has concluded

that "to be considered within the purview of
the Times privilege, an

individual must be either a nationally prominent
figure, a person
who voluntarily enters the fray of public discussion
on controversial

issues of pressing public concern or interest, or a person
who attempts
to guide such a public policy.

This attempted catch-all definition of "public figures" as

compiled by lower courts seems too narrow.

It implies that, to

be a "public figure, " a person must be either nationally well-known

or involved in matters of -pressing public importance.

However,

consider the case of Ceneda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting
Inc.

,

,

decided in a lower federal court one year after Butts and

Walker .

There, Judge Madden stated that a "public figure," within

the meaning of the Times doctrine, is "anyone who is famous because

of who he is or what he has done."
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Under this definition, anyone

whose name appears in print or is heard on television or radio is
a potential "public figure."

As has been observed:
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a cour-c cannot assume to gainsay
ox newsworthiness; according to

editorial judgment
the Madden formula,
all it can look to is whether the newspaper
has printed
a story about a man "because of
who he is or what he
ncs aone." That mightily inclusive
ground would seem
to cover practically every excuse a
newspaper could
na/e .or writing about a man. Thus it
appears that
newspapers are free to print whatever they
will about
anyone, so long as they do so without actual
malice. 55

Judge Madden's formula is no exaggeration of the
"public figure"
element of the expanding New York Times doctrine.

As in the Times

case, the Court majority in Walker refrained from
delineating the

boundaries of the reach of constitutional protection.

Lower courts,

therefore, were forced to apply the Times doctrine without
guidance

other than their own intuition.

Judge Madden's interpretation is a

logical extension of Chiei Justice Warren's intimations in Walker.
Three years after its decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts

,

the Court, again, but very briefly, discussed the "public figure"

concept.

In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn .

,

Inc .

,

v. Bresler,

the Court, in one short paragraph, acknowledged the wide range of pos-

sible plaintiffs included in the term "public figures."^ 0

The case

involved a libel suit brought against a newspaper by Bresler, whom the
Court described as "deeply involved in the future development of the

city of Greenbelt."

As Justice Stewart wrote:

He had entered into agreements with the city for zoning
variances in the past, and was again seeking such favors
to permit the construction of housing units of a type
not contemplated in the original city plan. At the same
time the city was trying to obtain a tract of land owned
by Bresler for the purpose of building a school. Negotiations of significant public concern were in progress,
both with school officials and the city council. Bresler'
status thus clearly fell within even the most restrictive
definition of a "public figure. "57
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This fragmentary reference was all the Court offered to clarify
the

constitutional perimeter
Times.

-of the

"public figure" addition to New York

The passage, nevertheless, at least by implication, reflects

the breadth of the "public figure" designation.

In the Greenbelt case,

Bresler was a real estate developer and builder in a small Maryland
city.

It happens that, during the period in question, he was also a

member of the Maryland House of Delegates; however, the Court did not
consider whether Bresler was also a "public official."

But, in the

Court's opinion, by being involved in land development at a time when
the city was planning to build, Bresler easily fell within "even the

most restrictive definition of a 'public figure.'"
It has been noted that the "broad public figure standard sanctioned

by Greenbelt

...

brings any person that voluntarily and actively

enters the public scene within the purview of New York Times ."
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No doubt this statement is true, but it interprets the implication
in Greenbelt perhaps too narrowly; the statement implies that to be

a "public figure," for purposes of New York Times , one must voluntarily

enter the public scene.

Bresler, of course, clearly fell within this

definition, since he was "voluntarily and actively" involved in public

affairs.

But the Supreme Court explicitly noted that Bresler

's

posi-

tion placed him within "even the most restrictive" meaning of the
term "public figure."

What, then, might be a liberal definition of

"public figure?"
The Court's use of the words "most restrictive definition" hints
that the full reach of the "public figure" concept might very well

include more than just those persons who "voluntarily and actively"
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involve themselves in public affairs.
graph in

hpee>u;eg.r.

The language in the short para-

does not rule out the possibility,
and in fact

it might even denote, that the constitutional
definition of "public

figure" approaches the extremely broad definition
suggested by Judge

Madden (see aoove); that is, any newsworthy person
is, by definition,
a "public figure."

Should such a rule take effect, it would have disastrous
implications
i.or

the ability to protect the social interest in safeguarding
repu-

tations.
figure

Under such a definition, a person could be deemed a
"public

merely by having his name become public in a newsnaper or

broadcast.

If the press sees fit to make known the affairs of even

a private person, that person could be deemed newsworthy and
thus,

under the Madden formula, a "public figure."

And, if a defamation

suit should arise from this situation, the private person made public,
like the "public official," would have to prove "actual malice," which
is impossible to prove against a responsible publisher.

Moreover, the

private person most likely has little access to the press.
This is an extreme situation, of course, and the Court probably does
not intend to go so far.

But, by failing to set any limits whatsoever

to the meaning of "public figure," the Court has left open the possibility,

especially in light of its brief but far-reaching statement in Greenbelt ,
that the "public figure" concept can be easily carried to extremes.

Whether the Court actually intends to adopt the simple and limitless

Madden formula is a matter for further judicial clarification.

Never-

theless, the fragmentary passage in Greenbelt clearly reveals that the

range of the "public figure" concept is very broad, indeed.
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A second question raised by the extension of New
York Times in Butts

and Walker involves the kind of criticism which can
constitutionally
be directed at "public figures."

New York Times protected criticism

aimed at the "official conduct" of "public officials."

any limit to what can be said about "public figures?"
words by Chief Justice Warren in Butts and Walker

,

But, is there

Except for a few

the Court has not

made any pronouncements which might provide an answer to the
question.

Warren argued that the "views and actions [of "public figures"] with
respect

public issues and events are often of as much concern to

to

the citizen as the attitudes and behavior of 'public officials' with

respect to the same issues and events."
"public figures

society

.

.

.

...

'

And, Warren added, since

often play an influential role in ordering

[o]ur citizenry has a ligitimate and substantial interest

in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in

uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events
is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials .'""

0

From these two sentences from Warren's opinion in Butts and Walker

,

one can conclude that the extension of New York Times embodies the right
to criticize the "views," "actions," and "conduct" of "public figures"

concerning "their involvement in public issues and events."

To state

these categories, however, is merely to reiterate the question.

As

I

have tried to demonstrate in an earlier section of this chapter, the

Court's elaboration of the "official conduct" element in New York Times
expanded the meaning of that term to include anything in the official's
life which might have a bearing on his fitness for public office.

Since "public figures" must be recognized as having "an influential

role in ordering society," to use Warren's words, does anything
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which might shed light on their
performance of chat role thereby
become
the standard for application of the
Times rule? The answer to
the

question must await further judicial
clarification.

Still, with or

without further elaboration, lower
courts must necessarily determine
each case whether the person libeled
is a "public figure," and

m

whether the defamatory statements
pertain to his involvement in

public matters.
Tne third, and most important, question
presented by the extension

of the Times doctrine is whether
the extension to "public figures"
is

merely a way station along the road the
Court has paved since New York
‘

- 1 rnes
-

‘

In other words, is debate on public issues
the criterion for

constitutional protection?

If so, limiting the protection created
in

New York Times to criticism of "public officials"
and "public figures"

presents the same illogical line-drawing which Chief
Justice Warren

attributed to Justice Harlan's refusal to extend New York
Times to
"public figures."

Can not a "private person," who is neither a "public

official" nor a "public figure," have some impact on the outcome
of
public issues?

To use Justice Douglas's example, what about "the

industrialists who raise the price of a basic commodity?""'
oe argued,

1

It might

of course, that the industrialists involved are "public fig-

ures" under the ruling Associated Press v. Walker .

But, consider the

ordinary butcher who is erroneously accused of selling bad meat.
this is a matter of public concern.

Surely

However, it would be stretching

the meaning of the term to consider the ordinary butcher a "public

figure," unless he is famous because of some other matter, or unless
one adopts the extremes of the Madden formula.

Under the latter standard,
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as 1 have argued above, the "public figure"
designation becomes bound-

less by allowing the press to make "public figures"
out of otherwise

private individuals.
However, the question of the breadth of the protection
created in
:iev;

and subsequent cases still remains.

- orl<::

Harry Kalven,

commenting on the Butts and Walker cases, noted that the Court "has
done exactly what would have been expected from New York Times.
But, it still is not certain whether the Court will continue that

course of expanding the ambit of free expression to include protection
for debate on public issues not involving "public figures/officials."

From "Public Figures" to "Public Issues"?

Within New York Times itself, there are several intimations that the

fundamental guarantee of the first amendment is the protection of debate
on public issues.

Indeed, the most celebrated passage from the Court's

opinion is the statement of "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wi de-open

..." 64

Harry Kalven has commented that "[w]hat catches

the eye [about these words] is the daring, unconventional selection

of adjectives.

These words capture the special quality of the Court's

stance toward first amendment issues."
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In another passage from the Court's opinion in Times

refers to

,r

,

Justice Brennan

t]he general proposition that freedom of expression upon

public questions is secured by the First Amendment" and that this

proposition "has long been settled by our decisions."

"Mr. Justice
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Brandeis, in his concurring opinion
in Whitney, v. California
the Court stated ’

"^ve

the principle its classic
formulation, when

ne said: "Ctlhose who won our
independence believed

discussion is a political duty." b?

.

.

.

that public

Of course, Brandeis was talking

aoout the protection of political speech.

The Court, however, has

repeatedly cited earlier cases such as
Whitney in supporting the argument that

L.t]he

guarantees for speech and press are not
the pre-

serve of political expression or comment
upon public affairs

..." 68

At another point in New York Times the
Court cited Coleman v.
,
_cnenran

£u. t

where the Kansas Supreme Court announced the
privilege to

discuss "a great variety of subjects,

.

.

.

including] matters of

public concern, public men, and candidates for
office.
The Supreme Court had explicitly recognized in
past decisions that

debate on public matters was protected by the first
amendment.

In

New Yo r k Times , however, the Court expanded the protection
afforded
to a particular area of

debate— criticism of public officials —

establishing a particularly strong constitutional safeguard.

by

Of

course, since the facts of the Times case involved alleged criticism
of a public official, the Court limited its extension of the newly

created guarantee to cases involving public officials.

Thus, it v/ould

not be fair to criticize the Court for not revolutionizing all state

libel laws in one sweep.

Because the Times opinion was buttressed here and there with

references to debate on public issues, it was logical to expect,
as some lower courts anticipated, that the constitutional rule would
be extended to protect all matters of public concern, regardless of

6o

whether the discussion involved criticism of a
public official

lost lower courts, however, to use one
observer's words
nave tried to work within the language of
the [Tines]
case, rather than to implement the first
amendment
principles implicit in the opinion. They have
almost
uniformly sought to apply or withhold the privilege
on tne basis of whether the complainant was
enough
lix:e ca puolic official to warrant the
application of
the Times rule.
The general feeling, nevertheless, was an expectation
that the Supreme

Court would inevitably broaden the range of application of
New York
72
limes.
In associated Press v. Walker as we have seen, the
Court
,

extended the reach of constitutional protection to debate involving
P^41ic figures.

And, in tnat case, Cnief Justice Warren bolstered

the belief that further extension was forthcoming when he referred
to the New York Times standard as "an important safeguard for the

rights of the press and public to inform and be informed on matters
of legitimate interest."
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Five months before Butts and Walker , the Supreme Court decided
Time, Inc , v. Hill .
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The case involved a suit brought by James Hill

against Life Magazine under a New York statute which established a
right of privacy.

The statute, as construed by the New York courts,

created a cause of action against a publication which makes a person the
subject of a "fictitious" report.
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In 1952, James Hill and his family

were kept hostage in their home by escaped convicts.

released unharmed, and no violence occurred.

The family was

They subsequently moved

away and discouraged further publicity regarding the occurrence.
Soon thereafter, a novel was published which described a similar
event, except that the novel depicted scenes of violence.

Later,

6l

the novel was made into a play, and
Life published a story
about the

play and related it to the Hill incident
by printing photographs of
the inside of the former Hill home, and
adding captions tying the

incidents
statute,

m

the play to the Hills' experience.

Jair.es

Under the New York

Hill sued for damages, alleging that Life
knowingly

gave the false impression that the play depicted
what had happened
to them.

The New York courts sustained a judgment against
Time, Inc.,

the owner of the magazine, ultimately awarding
Hill $30,000.^°

nl though ^ime was not a libel case, it is nevertheless
important
to the discussion of the applicability of New York
Times .

Justice

Brennan spoke for the Court in an opinion joined by Justice
White,
Stewcj.ru,

Black, Douglas, and, in part, Harlan.

Instead of a mere

negligence standard, the Court insisted that the New York Times
ccC

uual malice

in Time .

standard should have been applied at the trial level

"We hold," Brennan stated,

"that the constitutional protec-

tions for speech and press preclude the application of the New York

statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the
absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.

subject of the Life article, the Court added, was "no doubt

matter of public interest."

The

...

a
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The stronger constitutional shield provided by the "actual malice"

standard was necessary in protecting matters of public concern because
the Court argued, "[a] negligence test would place on the press the

intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reason-

ableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every
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reierence to a name, picture or portrait."

Negligence, the Court

continued, "would be a most elusive standard
a grave

.

.

[and] would present

.

hazard of discouraging the press from exercising
the consti-

tutional guarantees." 7 ^
And, as to the interest of persons injured by
erroneous publica-

tions, Justice Brennan noted that

Lejxposure of the self to others in varying degrees
is a concomitant oi life in a civilized community.
The risk of this exposure is an essential incident
of life in a society which places a primary value on
freedom of speech and of press. 80
rt.s

a balancing oi interests, therefore, the Court concluded
that the

value of free speech must be given greater weight than the interest
in
a right to privacy, at least in the absence of knowing falsity or

reckless disregard of the truth.

From Time , Inc , v. Hill one can

discern, to use Kalven's words, a "general rule

.

.

.

that if defen-

dant's statement deals with newsworthy events and people, it is privileged, that is, it cannot be made the predicate for tort liability."
"We are being reminded," Kalven concludes, "that newsworthiness defines

the ambit of constitutional concern

..."

O/J

The same arguments the Court made in Time involving privacy could
be employed to extend the application of the New York Times "actual

malice" standard to defamation cases involving matters of public
concern.

In Time the Court maintained that negligence is "a most

elusive standard," placing an "intolerable burden" on the press.
a standard, negligence would promote self-censorship.

As

In the context

of privacy cases, the Court was stating that a negligence standard is

insufficient to guarantee a free press.

But, if a negligence test is

"a most elusive standard" and an "intolerable burden" on the press,

it does not become more concrete and
less of a burden in defamation

cases.

In other words, by implying that "actual
malice" is the only

standard which can adequately safeguard the
freedom of the press, the
Court was providing a basis for extension of New
York Times to all
cases involving matters of public interest.

As Harry Kalven asks,

since Time was decided five months before Butts and
Walker
was it necessary

m

,

"n w

]hy

Butts and Walker to make a fresh argument" on
the

reach of New York Times ?°^
However, perhaps to maintain the votes of Justices Stewart
and/or

White

,

Brennan, writing the opinion in Time , specifically limited

the ruling to tne

discrete context" of the case.

"We find applicable

here," mrennan wrote, "the standard of knowing or reckless falsehood,
not through blind application of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan
relating solely to libel actions by
public officials, but only upon consideration of the
factors which arise in the particular context of the
a PPli ca-tion of the New York statute in cases involving
private individuals. This is neither a libel action
by a private individual nor a statutory action by a
public official. Therefore, although the First Amendment principles pronounced in New York Times guide our
conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying
these principles in this discrete context.
,

But the Court did not foreclose the possibility of extending the "actual

malice" standard to libelous publications involving matters of public
interest.

And, four years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia

Court was directly faced with that question.

,

Inc .

,

the

84

This case involved a libel suit initiated by George Rosenbloom against

Metromedia, Inc., a broadcasting company which had aired a report of
his arrest for distributing allegedly obscene magazines.

The magazines

64

were subsequently xound not to be legally
obscene, and after his

acquittal, Eosenbloom filed his suit against
the company.
At the trial, the jury awarded Eosenbloom
$25,000

in

general damages

and $725,000 in exemplary damages, which were later
reduced to $250,000.

However, on appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third

Circuit reversed the judgment.

The court maintained that the subject

of the oroadcast involved a matter of public concern
and that "the

•

fact that plaintiff was not a public figure cannot be
accorded decisive

importance if the recognized important guarantees of the First
Amendment are to be adequately implemented."

The Court of Appeals, therefore,

ruled that the New York Times "actual malice" standard applied.
In its disposal of Eosenbloom

,

the Supreme Court divided, reaching

a judgment, but unable to agree on a constitutional rule governing
the

Justice Brennan wrote an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger

case.

and Justice Blackmun joined.

Justice Black agreed with Brennan's main

argument, although he did not join the entire opinion.

Justice White

concurred in the result, but for reasons different from those of the
plurality.

Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented, while

Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
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Justice Brennan, who announced the judgment of the Court, conceded
that

[a]lthough the limitations upon civil libel actions,
first held in New York Times to be required by the
First Amendment, were applied in that case in the context of defamatory falsehoods about the official conduct
of a public official, later decisions have disclosed
the artificiality, in terms of the public's interest,
of a simple distinction between "public" and "private"
individuals or institutions.
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In explaining his position, Bre nnan used
the same logic which Chief

Justice Warren had employed in
to criticism of public figures,

.'6x

.

lkcr to extend the Times
privilege

In fos e nbloom , however, Justice

.merman carried the argument to its
full and final conclusion:
iu is clear that there has emerged from
our cases decided
since New York Ti mes the concept that the First
Amendment's
impact upon state libel laws derives not so much
from
whether the plaintiff is a "public official,"
"public figure," or "private individual," as it derives from
the question
whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns
a
matter of public interest. 88

'kne public's primary interest," Brennan proclaimed,
"is in the event,"

not whether the person involved is a public official or
public figure. 89
j.nd,

he continued, "Ci]f a matter is a subject of public or
general

interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private

individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did
not

'voluntarily' choose to become involved." 90

As I have tried to point out above, the Court's opinions in libel
cases, beginning with New York Times , have intimated that the first

amendment protects the right freely to discuss public matters.

But,

the constitutional doctrine explicitly announced by the Court was limited
to the "public official" and "public figure" rules.

In Rosenbloom ,

Justice Brennan felt that "the time has come forthrightly to announce
that the determinant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel

actions is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public
or general concern

..." 91

He recalled his own passage from New

York Times recognizing a "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-

open."
issues.

This time, however, Brennan underscored the words "public
,,92

rr

GO
,;

i’ h Justice Douglas not
participating in Hosenbloom . the
final

exte^io.* o. a__

__i a 1

was, at least temporarily,
precluded,

nad he taken part in the case, I
have become constitutional law.

am.

sure that Brennan's position
would

In Time, Inc. v . Hill,

and again in

Curtis' Puo ln s hxn Co. v. Butts, both
Black and Douglas consented to
,
;

join the opinion of three other justices,
to use Black's words, "in

order for the Court to be able at this
time to agree on an opinion
in this important case based on the prevailing
constitutional doctrine

expressed in New York Times Co. v. Cullivan ." 93

There is no reason

to believe that Black and Douglas this
time would have ignored the

opportunity to bring the Times doctrine closer to their
absolutist
views.

But since Douglas did not participate and a
majority was

unable to agree with Brennan's thesis, Elack felt no
need fully to
concur in an opinion which would not become law.

In a short concur-

ring opinion he did acknowledge his agreement with Brennan's
statement that the first amendment protection extends to "all discussion

and communica uion involving matters of public or general concern,

without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anony-

mous."

9/+

However, Black did not elaborate his agreement except to

repeat his belief that freedom of the press is absolute.

Justice White criticized Brennan and the dissenters for engaging
in "a purely intellectual" and "theoretical" exercise since no consti-

tutional agreement could be reached.

The case, White insisted, could

have been decided on a narrower ground within the context of the New
York Times rule.

He concurred in the decision to sustain the Court

of Appeals, basing his decision on the conclusion that

"” d]

iscussion

6?

of the conduct of public officials
cannot

...

be subjected to arti-

ficial limitations designed to protect
others involved in an episode
witn officials from unfavorable publicity ." 95
Thus, Justice White

would apply the "actual malice" standard of
New York Times to defamation suits brought by private individuals as
long as the publication's

central discussion focuses on official conduct.

""T]he First Amend-

ment," ne explained, "gives the press and
broadcast media a privilege
to report and comment upon official actions of
public servants in full

detail, with no requirement that the reputation or
the privacy of an

individual involved in or affected by the official action
be spared
from public view.' ,96
nosenoloor., ,

.vnite

narrower ground.

maintained, should nave been decided on this

However, he did not dismiss the possibility that

in a later case, he might accept the Brennan position.

among the Court majority which held, in Time

,

He had been

Inc , v. Kill , that the

"actual malice" test applies in privacy suits brought against persons

making false statements regarding matters of public concern.
Fosenbloom

,

And, in

White acknowledged that Brennan's arguments for extending

New York Times to public issues "are by no means frivolous ." 95

"But,"

he added, "I would not nullify a major part of state libel law until
we have given the matter the most thorough consideration and can articu-

late some solid First Amendment grounds based on experience and our

present condition."
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In a future libel case, if the Court should

agree on a majority position extending coverage of New York Times
to matters of public concern, I would not be surprised to find Justice

White in that majority.

Commenting on Justice White's opinion in
Rosenbloom

m

fact stated that

"

.

Justice Brennan

o]ur Brother White agrees that the
protection

ai xorded by the First Amendment depends
on whether the issue involved

m

the publication is an issue of general or
public concern," although

"[h]e would

.

.

.

confine our holding to the situation raised
by the

^acus in this case, that is, limit it to issues
involving 'offical

actions of public servants."'^

However, nowhere in his opinion does

Justice White explicitly, or even implicitly, state
that first amendment protection "depends" on whether the issue involved
is a natter
of public interest.

nis argument

His argument and the language he chooses to build

are careiully restricted to a discussion of the impor-

tance of debate involving the official conduct of public officials.

Perhaps Brennan's comment on White’s position was an unintentional
(or aeliberate) disclosure oi White's views in conference or, more

likely, an earlier draft of White's opinion.
If White should subsequently agree with the Brennan position,

then a majority

— Brennan,

Blackmun, Douglas, Burger, and White

would exist for extending the application of New York Times to any
libelous publication or broadcast which involves a matter of public
interest.

^

And, even if White should not adopt Brennan's thesis,

there is still the possibility that one of the subsequently appointed

Justices will do so.

Thus, with at least four justices expressly

committed to the "public issue" criterion, there exists the real

possibility that further expansion will be made of the New York Tines
rule.

But, this ultimate reformulation of New York Times would prac.

tically displace state libel law, and, in effect, would virtually make
it impossible to protect the social interest in safeguarding reputations.
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"Actual Malice"

TLuS

in tnis chaPter,

ftir

I

have been examining the Court's
delin-

eation of the reach of the New York Times
standard of liability.

The

problem has been defining the range of subjects
of discussion to which
one "actual malice" standard applies.

But an equally important, and,

perhaps, more dix^icult question has involved
the meaning of this

standard in practice.

When the Court first announced the
"actual mal-

ice" rule in New York Times

abstract

.

.

,

,

Justice Black denounced it as "elusive,

hard to prove and hard to disprove."

At most, he

cautioned, the standard would provide an "evanescent
protection" for
free speech rights.

101

Actual malice," of course, is much more concrete than
previous li-

ability standards, such as "ill-will," "bad motive," or,
even, "negligence."

The standard imposes liability if one of two, or both,
cri-

teria are met: knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.

And

the burden of proving actual malice is on the plaintiff, a task
much

greater than it would be under a liability standard such as "ill-will."
One

UcaS

to prove that tne deiendant knew the falsity of his defamatory

statements, or acted in reckless disregard of the truth.

And proof, the

Court explained, must be demonstrated with "convincing clarity ." 02
The first aspect of the Times rule cannot be written in words more

precise than those uged by the Court.

anything other than "knowing falsity."

"Knowing falsity" cannot mean
But when can speech be declared

to be in "reckless disregard of the truth?"

One man's standard of

"reckless disregard" may easily be another's concept of "negligence."
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As Justice Holmes once said, words
are not crystals. 103

As with any

legal standard or formula, the judgment
whether actual malice has
been met must be made by ordinary
mortals, whose measuring devices
vary substantially in sensitivity and
bias.

In a few cases subsequent to New York
Times , the Supreme Court

nas tried turther to explain how the
term "actual malice" is to be

applied.

In Garrison, for example,

the Court used the words "cal-

culated falsehood" and "the known lie" in
explaining "knowing falsi,,104

ty.'

Also

m Jam son

,

the Court asserted that "only those
false

statements made with a high degree of awareness of
their probable
falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject
of either civil
or criminal sanctions." 103

Here the Court was referring to "reckless

disregard," since knowing something is false is not
the same thing as

knowing it is probably false.
ihe Coir u emphasized that "the known lie" is no
essential part of

any exposition of ideas and, thus, deserves no constitutional
protec^iOi>..

And,

ohe court concludea,

"knowing falsity" equals "the known

lie;" "reckless disregard of the truth" is simply knowing that the

libelous statements are probaoly false,

cided four years after Garrison

,

m

St . Amant v. Thompson , de-

this is exactly what the Court ruled.

l0j

St. Amant is particularly significant because an intermediate state

court of appeal ruled that there was no evidence of actual malice.

The

Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, finding that there had been sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant had acted in reckless

disregard of the truth.

Finally, the United States Supreme Court, ex-

amining the evidence for itself, found that there was no actual malice
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involved.

The case, therefore, clearly
demonstrates the variability

of judicial measuring rods.
fne case involved a television
speech during which St. Amant,
a
candidate for public office, read the
answers to questions which he

had previously asked a local union
member.

Tnompson , St. Amant

The answers falsely charged

opponent in the election, with criminal
conduct.

's

Thompson sued St. Amant for libel, and the
trial court awarded him.
;?5

’

00 °.

The trial was

before the Court's ruling in New York

Times , but the Louisiana courts applied the
actual malice test on

appeal since, by then,
iiie

Lev;

iprk Times had been announced.

Louisiana supreme Court ruled that St. Amant
broadcasted the

false charges recklessly, although not knowingly.

He did not know

whether his opponent had engaged in criminal activities,
and, the

Louisiana court explained, he did not attempt to verify
the information, but read the false answers without concern for the
consequences.
ihe Supreme Court oi the United States, however, speaking through

Justice White, rejected the Louisiana court's application of the
"actual malice" standard, ruling that

reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have
investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts
shows reckless disregard for £ruth or falsity and
demonstrates actual malice.
Thus, "knowing falsity" is simply "knowing falsity;" the term cannot
be made more direct.

Under the test developed in St. Amant "reckless

disregard" is specifically narrowed down to "[publishing

.

.

.

[with]
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serious doubts as to the truth ]of
the libelous statements]
to St. Amant,

.

Prior

"reckless disregard" could conceivably
have been inter-

preted as reckless, "slipshod and sketchy
investigatory techniques,"
suer,

as failing to check the accuracy of
reported statements, when

fully aware of the harm that might result
from publication.

But even

this is not necessarily an awareness of
probable falsity. 10 ^

Jnder St. Amant, ''reckless disregard” is
just one step away from

"knowing ialsity;" "actually,” one observer
has noted, the two halves
110
of the actual malice standard are "close
kindred.”

To meet the

standard oi actual malice, then, a plaintiff must
convincingly prove
that the defendant was either consciously aware
that the defamatory

statements were false or seriously doubted whether they
were in fact
true.

This more refined and narrower definition of actual malice
is by
no means a cure-all for the problems associated with the
implementa-

tion

oj.

the actual malice standard of liability.

By defining reckless

disregard in terms of awareness of probable falsity, the Court, in
u.act,

created a very serious problem.

Not all libelous statements

involve factual matters which are either true or false; many libels

derive from opinion or comment which seriously injures the reputation
of individuals.

For example, as one critic has argued, "[a] statement

that a senator is mentally unbalanced, or that a hotel is dilapidated

and overpriced, or that a doctor is a quack, is a statement which,
although factual in form, is so intermixed with sentiment that an
adjudication of the issue 'truth vel non' would be fatuous.

111

Actual malice depends on whether the defendant knew or seriously
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doubted the ^ruth of allegedly/ defamatory
statements.

However , when

statemen ts cannot definitively be deemed false,
although verv injurious, th e actual malice standard,

in

:>t «

-.mar

,

cannot be

applied meaningfully.

Another problem is that the actual malice requires
a probing of the
defendant's state of mind.

Thus, the striking specific language

employed in the Court's standard of liability
notwithstanding, the
actual malice test becomes in practice one of interpreting
the mental
condition of the defendant at the time he contemplated and
published
nis lioeious statements.

Proving reckless disregard, defined as a

^ 3 gh degree Oi awareness of the probable falsity of the
challenged

statements, involves an assessment of the conduct and mental condition
of the defendant.

As the uourt in St . Amant noted, it is not enough

to measure "reckless disregard" as a failure to investigate.

There

must be convincing proof that the defendant was plainly aware that
the statements were most likely false.

narrow definition of reckless disregard.

Clearly, this is an extremely

Nevertheless, the application

of the test must in many cases be made with human judgment, irrespective

of its fallibility.

Recognizing that the actual malice standard may be erroneously
applied or interpreted in the vital area of free speech, the Court,
in every libel case decided with opinion, has made an independent

examination of the facts to determine for itself whether the standard
of liability has been met.

Chief Justice Warren has referred to the

Court's review of the facts as "the final duty v/hich this Court has
when violations of fundamental constitutional principles are alleged.
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ne expl ainea

>

must review the evidence to ascertain
whether the

">-w]e

judgment can stana consistently with those principles."

^

words of Justice Brennan, "this Court has an 'obligation
to test
c nailer,

ed judgments against the guarantees of the First
and Four-

teenth Amendments,' and in doing so 'this Court cannot avoid
making
an indeoendent constitutional judgment on the facts of the
case.'

msnnan conduced, "that

The simple „ac^ is,

queo tions o±

constitutional xact

'

the First Amendment

compel this Court's de novo review."

Thus, the Supreme Court has undertaken the task of independently

determining in each case whether the actual malice standard has been
met.

114

however, some members oi the Court have become disenchanted

with the Court's procedure.

Justice Black, for example, argued that

"what we do in these circumstances is to review the factual questions
in cases decided by juries
*1

A

—a

review which is a flat violation of the

£T

1

Seventh Amendment."

The Court's independent review of the facts of

each case, he claimed, would destroy the certainty and stability in the
law.

"No one," he contended, "including this Court, can know what is

and what is not constitutionally

ruling

....

...

libelous under this Court's

[T]he Court is suggesting various experimental expe-

dients in libel cases," Black concluded, "all of which boil down to a

determination of how offensive to this Court a particular libel judg.

ment may be

„116

.

.

.

.

."

Justice Harlan cautioned that de novo review, if undertaken

in’

case

after case, could result in the ineffective functioning of the Court.
And, Justice Marshall argued that the Court is "constitutionalizing
the fact finding process."

.

"[S]uch an approach," he warned, "will

117

.

.
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require this Court to engage in a
constant and continuing
supervision
oi defamation litigation
throughout the country." 119 These
arguments
are important criticisms of the
judicial function.
5utl at least in first amen dment cases, the
Court has made a consid-

eration of the specific facts of each case
a concomitant of applying

constitutional principles, because de novo
review is sometimes essential zo the safeguarding of free speech
rights.

Had the Court, for

example, remanded the New York Times case
without first ruling that
the evidence was constitutionally insufficient
for a finding of "actual

malice," it is most likely that the Alabama
courts would have concluded
that the Times acted with ’’actual malice."

The Court’s de novo review,

in fact, may prove to be the ultimate means
of overcoming a hostile

court and jury, such as those involved in the New
York Times case.

Insiouing on the need to review the facts, several members
of the
Court have been willing, to arrive at equitable results, in
the words
of .Justice Marshall, "at a substantial cost in predictability
and
120
certainty."
But if the Court is to set limits to the freedom of

speech and press, it must create rules.

As Justice Brennan correctlv

stated, "Cn]o matter how the problem is approached, this Court would

ultimately have to fashion constituional definitions

.

.

jn

St. Amant , Justice White recognized precisely the problem involved

in making constitutional definitions.

Speaking of "reckless disregard,"

he said that a constitutional standard "cannot be fully encompassed
in one infallible definition.

Inevitably its outer limits will be

marked out through case-by-case adjudication, as is true with so many
standards for judging concrete cases

122
.

.

.
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CHAPTER

III

CONCLUSION

Beginning with Hew York Tines in
1964, the United States
Supreme.
Court has written the constitutional
law of libel. The process
of constitutional law-making has been one of
balancing the conflicting interests of protecting reputations and
the freedom of expression.

—

tile

Prior to

balance in a majority of states had
been weighted

unevenly in that the interest in free speech
and press was not given
adequate protection.

Before the Court's intervention in
1964, libel

had been considered outside the scope of
the first amendment.

Since

.9u4, however, the Court has sought to
rectify the imbalance by placing

constitutional limits on state law in accordance
with the principles of
free speech and press established in the first
amendment.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia

,

the most recent libel case decided by

the Supreme Court, the final extension of the New
York Times actual malice standard almost became constitutional law.

In New York Times, the

Court created tne actual malice standard and expressly
limited its

application to cases involving the alleged defamation of public
officials,
jjater,

the Court applied the standard to cases involving public
figures,

and to a privacy case involving a matter of general public interest. And,
-l

o

oeems that one court is prepared to make "matters of public or general

concern" the constitutional criterion for application of the actual malice
test in defamation cases.

However, this ultimate extension, if left

unmodified, would again tilt the scales into imbalance by giving free

speech protection a "preferred position," while almost totally ignoring
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tne £oclal interest in
protecting reputation.
In the evolutionary process of
extending application of
New York Tin.es
the Court has relied on the
first amendment, logic, and
precedent. The
first amendment protects the
public's right to discuss and
debate public
issues. And, logic argues, if the
first amendment protects
equally the
discussion of all public issues, the
lieu York Times
privilege cannot

logically be limited to discussion of
public officials.

This was the

argument of Chief Justice Warren in
Talker , extending the actual
malice
rule to debate about public figures.
Surely, public figures have a

substantial impact on the outcome of
important political and social
decisions.

Justice Brennan also used this same
argument in Bosenbloom

where he advocated the extension of Kew
York Times to discussion of

all matters of public or general concern.

Bolstering logic, the Court has several times
quoted passages from
previous cases supporting the proposition that
the first amendment projects more than political speech.

"Freedom of discussion, if it would

full ill its historic function in this nation,
must embrace all issues

about which information is needed or appropriate to
enable the members
01 society to cope with the exigencies of their
period."'

And,

"ft]he

line oetween the informing and the entertaining is too
elusive for the

protection

...

of [freedom of the press].

tice Brennan has said,

In other words, as Jus-

'Ttlhe guarantees for speech and press are not

the preserve of political expression and comment upon public affairs."^
;.o

one would disagree with the view that the freedom of expression

includes more than the right to discuss political affairs.

The public,

indeed, has the right and need to express its views freely on matters
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of public interest.

Reviews of plays, books, and
.ovies, for instance,

are a form of expression which
certainly merits constitutional
protection. Discussion of any issue of
public concern, althou h it
may not be
E
vital to the governmental process,
requires constitutional protection
to ensure the freedom to communicate
ideas.

It would, of course, be logical and
consistent to apply the actual

malice standard to defamation cases involving
matters of public concern, regardless o: whether the person
defamed is a public official,

public figure, or private individual.

The concern of the first amend-

ment is with protection of the right freely to
communicate.
t-re

mw

ior-1

However,

limes standard of actual malice should not be
"logically"

applied across-the-board to all libelous publications
which discuss
matters of public interest or concern, unless provisions
are made to
ensure

mat

the person defamed has sufficient means to repudiate
the

defamatory charges made against him.

me
-Oloor.:

,

simple solution posed by Justice Brennan, in his opinion in Sosen-

would remedy the proolem involved in the conflict between libel

law and the first amendment by applying the actual malice test to all
cases involving a matter of public or general concern.

Taken by itself,

this solution, as a balancing of interests, is too sweeping; it blindly

elevates the freedom of expression and ignores certain important factors

which need consideration.
Although the first amendment embraces the freedom of expression, there
are different values of expression.

It is one thing, for example, to

argue that an individual has a constitutional right to produce an "X"
rated film; it is quite another, however, to equate this kind of speech
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Wltn tne cri - lca l discussion of governmental
operations.

There is a

vast difference between the public's right to
criticize its official

leaders and its right to capture pornography in
words and film.

Even

uustice Brennan implicitly acknowledges a scale of
values embodied in
the freedom of expression when he states that
"Cc]riticism of govern-

ment is at the very center of the constitutionally
protected area of
"4

-

iree discussion.

The first amendment does, indeed, safeguard the

'

values of free expression, but it need not do so with identical
standards 0^ pro tec oion.

Di^ferenc interests are involved and must be con-

sidered in creating constitutional protection.
Within the area

o^.

libel, cases exist

in which the interests are

strikingly difierent, although the focus of the discussion may be very
similar.

Libelous criticism of the President of the United States, for

example, entails a clearly different situation from that when defama-

tory statements injure a private individual who inadvertently becomes
caught in the midst of a public debate.

The President, as the center

of attention in American politics and in the press, is in a position
to successfully respond in defense.

He has instant access to the media.

The private citizen, on the other hand, ordinarily has no access to the
press, and, when erroneously defamed, he is left helpless and injured.

His only recourse, under Justice Brennan's solution, would be to prove

actual malice on the part of the publisher who defamed him, and this is
almost impossible to prove since most publishers do not deliberately lie.
The two situations are entirely different, notwithstanding the content
of the publications.

Yet Justice Brennan's solution would provide the

same standard of protection for the publications because both involve
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matters of public concern.

Riding on a theoretical principle
of first

amendment theory, Justice Brennan ignores
the practical implications
of his balance of interests.

moreover,

-he "matter of public or general
concern" criterion for

rhe application of the lev Y ork Times
standard has far-reaching and

dangerous implications.

The determination of what is a public
matter

is a more difficult problem than that of defining
"public official" or

puolic figure."

'The

perimeter of the "public concern" concept will

become at best imaginary when judges try to implement the
criterion in

real cases.

In kosenbloom

,

Justice Brennan wisely and necessarily did

not mark the boundaries of the term "matter of public or general
concern.
ne ins^eaci postponed "the delineation of the reach of that
term to future

cases."

5

But, as Justice Marshall correctly asserted, "all human events are

arguably within the area of 'public or general concern.'" 0

And, as

Henry V. Nickel notes:
The problems involved in determining what is
"private" and what is "public" for the purposes
of the privilege may well serve to destroy all
defamation laws. Logically, any issue about
which the public might form an opinion could
become a public issue ... .7

Justice Brennan denied that the category of "matters of public or
general concern" was open-ended.

"jS]ome aspects of the lives of even

the most public men," he insisted, "fall outside the area of matters

of public or general concern."'

3

Here, he cited Griswold v. Connecticut

which involved the use of contraceptive devices

—presumably

of what may lie outside the definition of public matters.

—

as an example

"But," as

n

8l

auspice harshall replied, "it is apparent that in
an era of dramatic
threat of overpopulation and one in which previously
accented standards
01 conduct are widely heralded as outdated, even the
intimate and per-

sonal concerns with which the Court dealt in that case cannot
be said
to be ouuside the area of

'public or general concern.'"^

Furthermore, private matters once made public through a media
publication or broadcast, no longer remain private.

In other words, the press

can make a private affair public, merely by publishing a private con-

cern as a newsworthy event.

Perhaps Justice Brennan did not intend

that the constitutional protection be extended to matters of public

curiosity.

But who are judges to rule that a matter of public concern

is really a matter of public curiosity,' and, therefore, does not fall

within the ambit of constitutional protection?

The distinction be-

tween public curiosity and public concern is much too fragile and elusive to be made.

Involving judges in such line-drawing may throw the

the judicial process into an absurd but serious embroglio.

Asking the

judiciary to determine without caprice what is and what is not of public concern will result in a disintegration of the "private affairs"

concept, since anything published is almost by definition "public."

Forcing the courts to draw chimerical lines between matters of public
concern and matters not of public concern

v/ill

inevitably result in

subjecting the courts, and finally the Supreme Court, to a humiliating
criticism of the kind endured, when courts attempt to define obscenity.
The task is simply not amenable to the process of judicial decision-

making.

Another implication of Brennan's solution involves
the actual malice
standard.
si-cy,"

Defined as "knowing falsity" or "awareness of
probable fal-

cue standard is set so high that it
effectively insulates the

prose by rr an ting the press an unconditional privilege,
as Ion-

minimum of care is observed.

r.s

a

Very few publishers deliberately print

or oroadcast known lies or statements which are believed
to be probable
lies.

But by publishing defamatory falsehoods, a publisher is still

capable of inflicting

serious injury on the subject of the publication,

ihat injury, ^ur-nermore, is frequently irreparable, since most people
do not have the means to repudiate through the media defamatory accusa-

tions made against them.

Since the reach of the "public concern" concept is, in practice, openended, and since the actual malice standard is so high, the concern for
the interest in the reputation of the falsely defamed private individual

becomes negligible under the solution offered by Justice Brennan.

The

private person usually has no access to the press, and thus his injury
must be endured, while the public remains misinformed.

Justice Brennan's position in Posenbloom

position of the Court majority,

,

which may soon become the

confers upon the press an enormous power,

which can be both destructive and constructive.

But the destructive

capacity of the press has been largely played down in the opinions of
the Court and some individual justices.

Yet the press, as Walter Lipp-

mann recognized over fifty years ago, has a power "unlike any that has
been exercised since the Pope lost his hold on the secular mind."

^

Today, that power has been magnified by the increasing technological

advancement; a oerson's reputation can be destroyed today in a matter o±
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minxes as false statements are broadcast
across

the nation.

A person's

privacy can instantly be taken away if
he oi.Ould inadvertently be
caught
in tne middle o: a public controversy
solas!ned across the front
pages
ox prominent newspapers.

Ihe press is an extremely powerful agent
in the formation of politi-

cal beliefs and in influencing the outcome
of important decisions.

has a very real impact on the way people
vote.

It

It is nonsense to argue
1

as Justice Black often did, that if the press
is not given an absolute

license to publish whatever it feels is newsworthy,
the first

araendraent

ireedom of expression will be sadly doomed to destruction.
Instead,

i

agree with Justice White's comment in Hosenbloom
where

he wrote:
i

am unaware that state libel

lav/s

with respect

to private citizens have proved a hazard to the
existence or operations of the communications

industry in this country. Some members of the
Court seem haunted by fears of self-censorship
by the press and of damage judgments that will
threaten its financial health . . . [However]
I am not aware that self-censorship has caused
the press to tread too gingerly in reporting
"news" concerning private citizens and private
affairs or that the reputation of private citizens has received inordinate protection from
falsehood.
1

1

Making Justice Brennan's solution to the conflict between

libel and

free speech the law of the land would unjustifiably deny any protection
to the falsely defamed private person unless he can convincingly prove

that his defamer knew that the statements were false or that they were

most likely false, or unless the person defamed has sufficient access to
the press to repudiate the defamatory accusations.

Under these circum-

stances, the private person will most likely have no redress whatsoever.
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:.or

is there any real protection
in the hope of proving
that the

defamatory statements did not
involve a matter of public
or general
concern.
Once broadcast or in 'o^int
xt v/ould
? ‘ lnt ’ it
very difficult co
maintain that the contents of a
defamation did not involve a
matter
Of "public concern." Even
if the matter is one of
mere gossip or
curiosity, the task of distinguishing
genuine public interest from
mere curiosity becomes extremely
difficult, if not impossible.
having criticized, as inadequate
and unfair, Brennan's solution,
,

which the Court seems prepared
to adopt, I think it is
appropriate to
offer an alternative approach which
more equitably balances the competing interests involved. The
solution which I propose is very
simple.
As a supplement to the law of libel,
the right of reply represents
the
most direct and precise means of
accommodating the protection of an

individual's reputation with the maintenance
of a free press ." 2

If

d person erroneously defamed
were guaranteed the right immediately
to respond to a defamatory
publication about him, not only would he

be able to protect his own reputation,
but, also, the public audience

would not be left with false information.
Gi

course, as with any attempt legally to solve
social conflicts,

tnere are many difficulties involved in the
implementation of the right
of reply.

The foremost, perhaps, is creating that right.

The most

appropriate source from which the right of reply might emerge
is a
statute, either federal or state.

.

But, presently, there is no federal

statute granting a right of reply; and, only a few states currently

supply the person defamed with that right.
However, the Court itself could supplement a constitutional right

of reply to the growing constitutional
~

^

...

iii.:

Co

supreme G our

,

..

had.

lav;

of libel.

Prior to New

not made a single pronouncement on

the constitutional limits of libel law, except to state that libel was

not constitutionally protected speech.

Since then, the Court has cur-

tailed the reach of state libel law by adding to the simple words of the
first amendment an extremely high standard of liability for certain

kinds of speech.

Through judicial rulings,

the consitutional law of

libel holds that a public official or a public figure in a libel case
must prove actual malice on the part of the critic or publisher who

defames him.

As another judicial artifact, the Court could rule that

the press must allow those who are defamed the means to counter the

defamation made against them.

In other words, as a prerequisite to a

successful defense, the press must provide the defamed with a chance to
counter the defamatory attack.

Unlike the Court's balancing of interests, the right of reply aims

directly at resolving the conflict between a free press and the protection of reputations.
of libel; by

But it should be only a supplement to the law

itself, it cannot provide an adequate solution to the

problem.
In Chapter I, I argued that a right of reply should complement the

Court's actual malice rule in cases involving alleged defamation of
public officials.

That is, to deter deliberate lies, the actual malice

offictest ought to be retained in cases involving defamation of puolic

ials.

Thus, if a public official believes that he was deliberately

reply, but he
and falsely defamed, he should not only have the right of

should also be able to initiate

a'

damage suit to "punish" the de^amer

86

for deliberately lying.

Indeea, the right of reply together
with the actual malice test,
to
aecer delioerately false defamation,
represents the best balance of in-

terests for all potential libel cases.

That is, instead of attempting

to define "public official," "public
figure," or "matter of public con-

cern," the constitutional

lav;

of libel would best accommodate
the con-

flict of interests in all libel cases if the
person defamed were assured
a right of reply and the irresponsible press
were deterred from deliber~ te ly defaming individuals.

An effective right of reply would guaran-

tee the iormer, and the actual malice test would be an
effort to ensure
the latter.

The actual malice standard is set high enough to
safeguard

a free and responsible press.

3y itself, however, the actual malice test applied to all cases

would leave nelpless ana injured all those unable to attain access to
the press.

«ay

In this sense, Justice Brennan's proposed solution, which

e ventually

become law, olindly and quite effectively would destroy

the ability to protect the reputations of private individuals

— in

fact,

the reputation of anyone without sufficient means to respond to defama-

tory charges.

Although

I

believe that the Court will eventually accept Brennan's

thesis as announced in Rosenbloom , there is nevertheless a hopeful hint
that Justice Brennan might endorse the right of reply as a supplement
to the developing constitutional law of libel.

In Rosenbloom , Brennan

wrote: "[ilf the States fear that private citizens will not be able to

respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the

direction of ensuring their ability to respond

.

.

.

."

In-

8?
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CHAPTER I

1T
jl'nis
is not the
o^j.y a summary is
•

•

place to set forth all the facts of
the Times
case
presented. For a more extensive
examination^
see harry Kalven, Jr., "The New York Times
Case: A Note on the
'Central Meaning, of the First Amendment,'"
1964 Sun. Ct. Rev. 191
Go. . pn. iSr-200
see also Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., "T1 e
Anatomy of an
i0n:
e
York IiEes Co - v - s “Hivan," 43
N.C.l."Rev.ll5,
i'
Q^? and alS
°
'
v ‘ lulllvan . 376 U.S. 254,
25 -i 5 (1364)
,

;

;

/

—

—

—

Reprinted in New York Times Co. v
257-258 (1964).
3

Ibid .

,

Sullivan

,

376 U.S. 254,

p. 261.

4

the Supreme Court's assessment of the evidence at
376 U.S.
„
254, 284-292 (1964).
Some six witnesses for the plaintiff testified
tnat they associated the statements with Sullivan. For a summary
of
their testimony see 376 U.S. 254, 290 n. 28 (1964). Or. appeal
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disregard. But this is not necessarily "probable falsity." There is no
mention that the publisher was highly aware that what he was publishing
was probably false. In fact, since the Butts affair was reported to the
publisher, whatever evidence is described in the case points to the beliei that the publisher probably felt that the story was true, reckless
investigatory procedures notwithstanding. Thus, under the test announced
in St . Amant, I think more evidence would be required to prove that the
Saturday Evening Post was aware of the probable falsity of its publication.
,
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